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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When one contemplates the universe of human rights violations, 
intellectual property rights probably are not first, or even tenth, on the 
list of things that come to mind.  Human rights violations usually call to 
mind such things as violence against a civilian populace by government 
authorized (or government incited) forces, suppression of unpopular 
views, violations of fundamental due process rights, especially regarding 
criminal trials, and so on.  If one contemplates economic issues at all 
under the rubric of human rights, it probably will be in the form of a 
population living in poverty, educational deprivations, and the like, 
again normally perpetrated (or neglected) in some manner by persons 
acting on behalf of or at the behest of a government.  Private harms of 
the sort normally at issue in intellectual property situations ordinarily are 
not the stuff of human rights issues.1  Thus, you may be surprised to 
 
 1.  This is not to say that intellectual property issues do not involve government action.  
Some intellectual property problems clearly do involve governmental agencies, whose approval 
may be required before certain intellectual property rights come into existence.  In the United States, 
patents must be issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) before patent rights exist and 
PTO review is required before trademark registrations are issued.  Trademark rights in the United 
States can exist without governmental approval, though certain trademark rights accrue only upon 
registration.  In other countries, trademark rights exist only after registration with the government.  
2
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learn that human rights agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, contain express provisions favoring the existence of 
intellectual property rights.2  You may be equally surprised to learn that 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), the designated arbiter 
of claims brought against countries for violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”), has heard a number 
of cases involving intellectual property rights, including cases brought 
by corporate entities.3  In our globalized economy intellectual property 
rights holders have begun to invoke human rights laws and treaties to 
protect their interests.4  These uses of human rights agreements raise a 
number of interesting and potentially troubling questions, especially for 
the future of human rights enforcement.  The purpose of this paper is to 
examine some of those questions. 
This article focuses on one human rights treaty, the Convention, 
and the possible uses of its provisions to secure and expand intellectual 
property rights (“IP rights”).  Although the Convention does not contain 
any provision specifically referencing IP rights, it does contain several 
provisions that could be used to expand IP rights.  Furthermore, the 
existence of a substantial body of interpretive case law from the ECHR 
affords us a more detailed perspective on the manner in which the 
Convention could be used to further IP rights.  Finally, the group of 
countries adhering to the Convention, though all part of Europe, 
represent a somewhat diverse collection of governments, from the U.K. 
to Germany, to the Czech Republic, to the former constituent states of 
the Soviet Union (including Russia), to Turkey.  Although not 
completely representative of a range of possible human rights 
viewpoints, it is a sufficiently diverse group to provide a useful window 
into the problem.5 
 
See, e.g., C. PROP. INTELL. 712-1 (Fr.).  Copyrights in U.S. works must be registered with the 
Copyright Office before a suit is initiated.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
 2.  Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documen
ts/udhr (last visited July 20, 2011). 
 3.  See, e.g., Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03, ¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2008) 
(HUDOC); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) 
(Grand Chamber). 
 4.  Intellectual property is not the only strange bedfellow with human rights.  Hedge funds 
threatened to go to the ECHR if Greece were to default on its debts.  Landon Thomas Jr., Hedge 
Funds May Sue Greece if it Tries to Force Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at B1. 
 5.  See Wojciech Sadurski, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalization of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council 
3
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In a 2008 article, Professor Laurence Helfer outlined several 
possible frameworks that the ECHR might use to review intellectual 
property disputes under one provision of the Convention: Article 1 of the 
First Protocol.6  I do not propose to challenge either Professor Helfer’s 
premises or his concerns that certain approaches to the problem by the 
ECHR could have untoward consequences for the stability of IP rights 
and for human rights enforcement.7  However, I do intend to suggest 
several ways that the ECHR could become enmeshed in IP rights 
disputes, not only under Article 1, but under other provisions of the 
Convention, such as Article 8 (dealing with rights of privacy) and 
Article 10 (dealing with free speech and free press).  I will suggest that 
the ECHR’s case law makes it increasingly likely that IP rights holders 
and potential rights holders will invoke the Convention to secure and 
expand IP rights.  I do so not from a conviction that the ECHR should be 
involved in such matters, or that the court should expand IP rights, but 
because I believe that the ECHR’s involvement is inevitable and that its 
precedent makes IP rights expansion not unlikely.  Thus, to the extent 
that human rights advocates believe that such involvement by the ECHR 
will have negative consequences, this article can serve as a wake-up call 
to the possible world that lies ahead. 
 The article begins with a brief examination of the Convention, 
followed by a discussion of provisions relevant to IP rights and some 
recent cases in the ECHR that raised the issue of using human rights 
provisions in an intellectual property context.  Building on these cases 
and provisions, the article raises the following issues: (1) In what ways 
could the Convention be interpreted to expand or even create particular 
IP rights?; (2) Will the use of the Convention in these situations have 
unforeseen effects on IP rights as they are now understood?; (3) Who are 
the likely beneficiaries of the use of the Convention in intellectual 
property cases?; (4) What effect could the use of the Convention have on 
attempts to create a more global intellectual property law?; and (5) 
 
of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments (Nov. 4, 2008) (unpublished Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 08/135, University of Sydney Law School) at 4, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295652 (noting the diversity of the European Union). 
 6.  Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2008).  As explained more fully below, 
Article 1 of the First Protocol is a Convention provision that protects property rights.  It is 
somewhat analogous to the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, but has important 
differences as well.  U.S. CONST., amend. V.  For a more general discussion of human rights and IP 
rights see Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a 
Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007). 
 7.  See, e.g., Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6, at 51-52.   
4
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Could such uses weaken human rights protections in more traditional 
situations? 
II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: BACKGROUND 
AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
A. Background 
The European Convention on Human Rights arose from the rubble 
of World War II and the human rights abuses during the period from the 
end of World War I to the end of World War II.  In May, 1949, ten 
countries signed the Treaty of London, establishing the Council of 
Europe.8  A year and a half later, in November, 1950, the members of 
the Council signed what is formally known as the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—the European 
Human Rights Convention.9  The Convention has been amended by 
fourteen protocols since its inception, adding to the list of rights 
protected.10  The Convention is administered by the Council of Europe.11 
The Convention now has forty-seven signatories, half of which 
have been added since the beginning of 1990.12  All of the members of 
the European Union are also members of the Council of Europe and 
adhere to the Convention.13  The potential reach of the Convention is 
thus much broader than the European Union.  Although the Council of 
Europe does not have enforcement mechanisms as robust as those of the 
EU, this does not leave the Convention impotent.  The Council has its 
own judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights, based in 
 
 8.  See The Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=datesCles&l=en (last visited May 2, 2013). 
 9.  European Human Rights Convention, Sep. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
Convention]. The text of the Convention can be found at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treatie
s/Html/005.htm (last visited May 2, 2013).  The United Nations already had promulgated the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, in 1948.  See History of the Document, THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2012).  
 10.  See Treaty Office, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2012). 
 11.  The Council has a web site providing a portal for its activities.  See www.coe.int (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
 12.  Many of the new members, including Russia, were former Soviet Bloc countries, or were 
part of the former Soviet Union.  See 47 Counties, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 13.  Great Britain has incorporated the Convention into its Human Rights Act 1998—at least 
regarding actions of public authorities.  See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 
(H.L.) [¶ 49]; Human Rights Act, 1988, c. 42 (U.K.). 
5
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Strasbourg, France.14  The Strasbourg Court15 hears cases brought by 
individuals against countries alleged to have violated the Convention,16 
and issues written decisions that include a rationale.  Although the 
ECHR has no direct enforcement vehicle, members of the Council of 
Europe (whose members are contracting parties to the Convention) have 
agreed to abide by the Court’s decisions.17  And, to a great extent, it 
appears that they do so, at least in Western Europe.18 
The Convention also influences European law through 
implementation of the Convention into the domestic law of various 
countries.  Great Britain’s 1998 Human Rights Act did so, and its courts 
have looked to the decisions of the ECHR for interpretive guidance.19  
Although the EU has not adopted the Convention as EU law, its 
principles have been incorporated into the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”).20  Both of these mechanisms tend to make the 
Convention a part of the legal regimes of member countries.21 
 
 14.   The Court was created in 1959.  Prior to November 1, 1998, human rights complaints 
were handled in the first instance by the Commission on Human Rights, which was created in 1954.  
See The Court in Brief, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_en_bref_EN.pdf  (last visited July 21, 2011).  It was not until Protocol 
#11 was adopted in 1998 that a full-time court was established and that member states were required 
to allow individual complaints to be brought against them (previously the country had to consent to 
such suits) as opposed to complaints by one member country against another. 
 15.  For convenience and to distinguish it from the European Court of Justice, I will 
sometimes refer to the European Court of Human Rights as the Strasbourg Court.  
 16.  Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34.  Article 34 of the Convention gives individuals the 
right to bring actions in the ECHR.  Article 33 gives member countries the right to “refer to the 
Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention” by another member country. Id. at 
art. 33. 
 17.  See id. at art. 39, ¶ 4 (dealing with friendly settlements); Id. at art. 46, ¶ 2 (dealing with 
judgments).  The Committee of Ministers of the Council is responsible for the execution of the 
ECHR’s judgments.  It maintains a Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court.  The 
Committee can refer cases to the ECHR if, inter alia, a country is refusing to abide by a judgment. 
 18.  See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R. July 28, 2005) 
(Judgment—Just Satisfaction—Friendly Settlement) (HUDOC) (Germany agrees to pay €115,000 
in compensation and expenses).  Moreover, to the extent that Convention member countries wish to 
join the EU, their willingness to abide by the ECHR’s interpretation of the Convention no doubt will 
be relevant to the admission decision.  Many countries directly implement the ECHR’s judgments.  
See Execution of Judgments of the ECHR, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
 19.  See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 (H.L.) [254-55]; Ferdinand v. MGN 
Ltd., [2011] EWHC 2454 (Q.B.).   
 20.  See, e.g., Andrew Williams, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: Past and 
Present Tendencies (Apr. 5, 2011) (unpublished Legal Studies Research Paper No.2011-06, 
University of Warwick School of Law) at 5, 9-11, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1803138. 
 21.  But cf. Murray v. Express Newspapers plc, [2007] EWHC 1908 [¶¶ 60-62] (Ch.D.) 
(British courts are bound to follow House of Lords decisions in cases of conflict with European 
6
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B. Pertinent Provisions of the Convention for IP Rights 
Undoubtedly, the ECHR influences the laws of member states.  But 
this still leaves the question: what is the connection between the 
Convention and intellectual property?  To answer this question, we need 
to identify provisions of the Convention pertinent to IP rights and 
discuss the methodology used by the ECHR to decide cases brought 
under those provisions. 
Because we are discussing intellectual property, it seems sensible to 
start with a provision dealing with property rights.  The Convention 
contains such a provision, namely Article 1 of the First Protocol, which 
provides as follows: 
Protection of Property: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.22 
Article 123 looks a bit like the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.24  That is, it appears to protect against a 
governmental appropriation of property.  The Constitution refers to 
“private property” being “taken” while Article 1 refers to “peaceful 
enjoyment of . . . possessions.”  These are not necessarily identical 
concepts, although, as indicated in the discussion below, the concept of a 
“possession” is very similar to “property.”25  It may seem a stretch to 
apply Article 1 to intangible intellectual property rights; however, it is 
notable that the United States Supreme Court has applied the Takings 
Clause to intellectual property.26  Article 1 was the focus of Professor 
 
Court of Human Rights decisions). 
 22.  See Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, art. 1. 
 23.  References to “Article 1” should be presumed to refer to Article 1, First Protocol, unless 
otherwise specified. 
 24.  The Takings Clause provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
 25.  The concept of a “possession” under Article 1 is discussed infra text at notes 123 to 136.  
It is also worth noting that the title of Article 1 refers to “property,” even if the text of the provision 
does not. 
 26.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets treated as 
7
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Helfer’s discussion of the ECHR’s approach to IP rights disputes.27  The 
ECHR has held that Article 1 is applicable to IP rights,28 and Article 1 
will play an important role in the analysis to be presented here.  
However, there are two other provisions of the Convention that are less 
directly related to property rights, but whose interpretation may have a 
significant impact on IP rights and on the application of Article 1 to IP 
cases.  Those two provisions are Article 8 and Article 10 of the 
Convention, which provide, respectively, as follows: 
Article 8—Right to Respect for Private and Family Life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.29 
Article 10—Freedom of expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.  This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
 
property under the Takings Clause).  But cf. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349-53 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (patentee could not use Takings Clause as basis for claim against government for 
using patented invention). 
 27.  Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6. 
 28.  See, e.g., Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03, ¶¶ 34-35 (Eur. Ct. H.R.  Jan. 29, 2008) 
(copyright); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 
2005) (Chamber opinion); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 
11, 2007) (Grand Chamber) (trademark registration application). 
 29.  See Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8. 
8
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disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.30 
At first glance, it might not appear that these articles have any 
direct connection with intellectual property.  Article 10, the rough 
analogue to the First Amendment in the United States, clearly could limit 
IP rights, but it seems an unlikely source for creating or expanding them.  
However, as discussed below, the manner in which the right to free 
expression is interpreted may make it less of a barrier to IP rights than 
one might believe, and may make it a source of IP rights.  Article 8, 
particularly subsection 2, appears to afford protection from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion.  Nevertheless, as will be seen, Article 8 is a 
broader and more affirmative right than it may appear on its face, 
possibly giving rise to IP rights.31 
These three provisions form the basis of the argument that the 
Convention may be used to expand intellectual property rights. 
III. KEY PRINCIPLES FOR IP RIGHTS EXPANSION 
A. Starting Points: Von Hannover v. Germany—The ECHR’s 
Decision 
Although it might seem more logical to begin with Article 1, the 
property rights provision, I prefer to begin with Article 8, because its 
jurisprudence affects the analysis of other provisions, including Article 
10 and Article 1.  One decision from the ECHR in particular brought 
privacy issues to the forefront of IP rights and related rights, and 
provides a convenient starting point for the discussion of the ECHR’s 
analytical framework.  That case, Von Hannover v. Germany,32 was a 
suit by Princess Caroline of Monaco, complaining that photographers 
were invading her privacy by taking (and publishing) pictures of her and 
her family in various non-official public and private settings. 
In Von Hannover, Princess Caroline of Monaco, who lives most of 
the time in Paris, complained about a number of photographs published 
by three German magazines.33  The photographs included several of her 
 
 30.  Id. at art. 10. 
 31.  See infra Part III. B. 
 32.  Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004).  As 
discussed below, there was a second Von Hannover case in the ECHR, decided eight years later.  It 
also dealt with photographs taken of Princess Caroline and her family.  Von Hannover v. Germany 
(no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 33.  The pictures were taken while the Princess was in France, where she maintains an 
apartment.  Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶ 8.  However, they were published by German 
9
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with her children, some of her in public places, one in a restaurant (with 
a boyfriend), and some taken of her while she was on vacation.34  She 
sued the publications in the German courts, claiming violations of her 
right to privacy, her rights to control her image under the German 
Copyright Act, and, perhaps notably, her personality rights under the 
German Basic Law.35  The trial court and first level appellate court ruled 
that German law did not grant relief because of Princess Caroline’s 
status as a kind of public figure.36  On further appeal, the court ruled that 
the photos of her in the restaurant—as a “secluded place” —were a 
violation of her right to privacy, but that the others were not.37  From this 
ruling Princess Caroline appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany,38 whose ruling the ECHR quoted at some length. 
The Federal Constitutional Court issued what was considered a 
landmark decision, ruling that, although publication of some of the 
pictures in question violated Princess Caroline’s right to privacy, several 
others did not.39  In its ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court balanced 
her right to privacy under German law against the right of free 
expression found in the German Basic Law.40  In its opinion, the court 
specifically held that entertainment is worthy of protection under the 
concept of free expression.41  It also held that the press was entitled to a 
certain “margin of manoeuvre” to decide what is in the public interest to 
print.42  Applying these principles, the court found that some of the 
 
periodicals. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 34.  Id. at ¶¶ 11-17. 
 35.  Id. at ¶ 18.  It is also interesting that her suit—in German courts—sought relief against 
the publications under French law.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
 36.  Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21.  The German court found her to be a figure “par excellence.”  Id. at ¶¶ 
19, 21, 23.  The courts enjoined republication of the photographs in France, but under French law.  
Id. at ¶ 19. 
 37.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
 38.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
 39.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
 40.  Id. at ¶ 25 (¶ 1 of the quoted portion of the Constitutional Court’s opinion). 
 41.  Id. at ¶ 25 (quoting from paragraph (b) of the Constitutional Court’s opinion).  A portion 
of the German court’s opinion was as follows:  
The fact that the press fulfills the function of forming public opinion does not exclude entertainment 
from the functional guarantee under the Basic Law.  The formation of opinions and entertainment 
are not opposites.  Entertainment also plays a role in the formation of opinions.  It can sometimes 
even stimulate or influence the formation of opinions more than purely factual information.  
Moreover, there is a growing tendency in the media to do away with the distinction between 
information and entertainment both as regards press coverage generally and individual 
contributions, and to disseminate information in the form of entertainment or mix it with 
entertainment (“infotainment”).  Consequently, many readers obtain information they consider to be 
important or interesting from entertaining coverage.   
 42.   Id.at ¶25 (quoting from paragraph (a) of the German Constitutional Court opinion). 
10
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pictures, taken while she was with her children and in secluded areas, 
were overly intrusive.43  Others, however, even some in semi-private 
locations, were deemed legitimate because of her status as a public 
figure.44  After further rounds of proceedings in the German courts, the 
earlier results were reaffirmed.45  Dissatisfied with the German courts’ 
resolution, Princess Caroline took her case to the European Court of 
Human Rights.  That court ruled in her favor.46 
Much like the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the ECHR 
considered the matter to require balancing the right to privacy, found in 
Article 8 of the Convention, and the right to free expression, found in 
Article 10.47  Notably, although the ECHR quoted extensively from the 
opinions of the German courts (the lower courts as well as the Federal 
Constitutional Court), it gave little if any deference to the balance 
between privacy and free expression drawn by the German courts, using 
rights under German law analogous to those provided by the 
Convention.48  The German courts emphasized Caroline’s status as a 
public figure.  Moreover, the German courts held that free press rights 
encompass entertainment as well as “hard” news.  In their view, this 
afforded the press more leeway in its reporting.  By contrast, the ECHR 
accorded little credence to the public figure status of the Princess, noting 
that she had few public duties as a princess, and that the pictures were 
not reflective of those duties.49  Instead, the court found that the pictures 
simply satisfied the public’s curiosity about the lifestyle of a princess, 
which the court believed was an insufficient basis to override her right to 
privacy.50  Thus, the court found in favor of Princess Caroline and 
against the state of Germany (the ECHR issues judgments against 
 
 43.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
 44.  Id. at ¶ 25 (Constitutional Court’s opinion). 
 45.  Id. at ¶¶ 19-38. 
 46.  Id. at ¶¶ 78-80. 
 47.  Id. at ¶ 58. 
 48.  The issue of the proper level of deference—called a “margin of appreciation” by the 
ECHR—is discussed infra Part IV. 
 49.  Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64 (“The situation here does not come within the sphere of any political or 
public debate because the published photos and accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to 
details of the applicant’s private life.”). 
 50.  Id. at ¶¶ 65-66 (“The Court considers that the publication of the photos and articles in 
question, of which the sole purpose was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding 
the details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general 
interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public.  In these conditions freedom of 
expression calls for a narrower interpretation.”); id. at ¶¶ 72-74, 77 (“The Court considers that the 
public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant is and how she behaves 
generally in her private life even if she appears in places that cannot always be described as 
secluded and despite the fact that she is well known to the public.”). 
11
Welkowitz: Privatizing Human Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 3 - WELKOWITZ (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/2013  10:13 AM 
686 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:675 
Convention member states).51 
B. Von Hannover as a Basis for Creating Privately Enforceable 
Rights: the Affirmative Obligations of Member Countries to 
Enforce the Convention 
The right to privacy and its supremacy (at least in some contexts) 
over free expression may lead directly to an IP right, namely the right of 
publicity.  In the United States, the right of publicity, which is now 
widely recognized as a property right, had its origins in the tort concept 
of the right to privacy.52  And it may be, as discussed below, that the 
ECHR’s privacy decisions will ripen into a property right protectable 
under Article 1, as well as Article 8.  However, the importance of the 
Von Hannover decision transcends its basic result.  The opinion provides 
a framework that bridges the gap between human rights as a protection 
against unwarranted governmental intrusion and human rights as a 
vehicle to remedy harms perpetrated by private actors.  The intrusion of 
which Princess Caroline complained was not in any way the product of 
state action directed against her.  It was an entirely private intrusion.  
Although her suit in the ECHR was against the German government, the 
gravamen of her lawsuit was a dispute between private parties—her 
lawsuit in the German courts was against various publications.  
Essentially, her claim in the ECHR was that German law did not afford 
her sufficient protection against private intrusions, and therefore the 
German government was not protecting her privacy as required by 
Article 8 of the Convention.  By ruling in favor of Princess Caroline, the 
ECHR effectively created an affirmative right from Article 8, rather than 
simply a negative right.  In other words, Article 8 did not just protect 
Princess Caroline from governmental intrusions (a negative right); it 
required the government to shield her from the intrusions of others, even 
to the extent of providing an appropriate civil action in its courts (an 
affirmative right).53  The imposition of an affirmative obligation on the 
 
 51.  Id. at ¶ 80.  The ECHR was asked to issue a judgment for approximately €142,800, but 
reserved the question of damages for later decision.  Id. at ¶ 85.  A settlement of the judgment in the 
amount of €115,000 was later recorded. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. July 28, 2005) (Just Satisfaction—Friendly Settlement). 
 52.  See e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.3d 425 (Cal. 1979) (rights of publicity arose 
from privacy tort); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2013) (recognizing a property right); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-761(G) (2007) (soldier’s right of publicity); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
1075/15 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
1448(B) (West 2013). 
 53.  Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶ 57 (“The boundary between the State’s positive 
and negative obligations under this provision does not lend itself to precise definition.  The 
12
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country to effectuate the right is a marked contrast to the Bill of Rights 
jurisprudence in the United States, which requires some form of state 
action in order for its provisions to be invoked.54  It is also a critical 
bridge between a system focusing on state actions and a system that 
contemplates the creation of new obligations without the necessity of 
state action.  Thus, if the effectuation of the rights granted by the 
Convention requires a country to enact legislation (or create common 
law) that grants a cause of action to one private party injured by another 
private party, then the ECHR becomes a vehicle to effectuate those 
obligations.  To put the matter into IP rights language, if the effectuation 
of any of the provisions of the Convention requires the creation or 
expansion of IP rights, then the ECHR will issue judgments that 
effectively require such creation or expansion.55 
Moreover, there does not appear to be any textual reason why such 
an affirmative obligation would not be imposed with regard to the 
effectuation of any of the rights granted under Article 10 or Article 1, 
First Protocol.  The first sentence of Article 8, which grants the right to 
privacy, does not invoke any notion of state action.  It simply says that 
everyone is entitled to privacy.56  Similarly, Article 10 states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression,”57 and Article 1 
states that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions.”58  There is no textual invocation of any 
state action or any indication that the right only insures against instances 
of state interference.59 
 
applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar.”).  
 54.  The affirmative obligation of states under Article 8 and other Convention provisions has 
been reaffirmed by the ECHR.  See Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶98 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012) (Grand Chamber); Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, ¶75 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10, 2007) (Grand Chamber).   
 55.  Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶57.  The ECHR cannot directly order states to 
enact legislation.  However, as noted earlier, an arm of the Council of Europe oversees compliance 
with the court’s judgments and will inquire about legislation needed to effectuate the court’s ruling.  
See A unique and effective mechanism, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
 56.  Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8. 
 57.  Id. at art. 10. 
 58.  Id. at protocol 1, art. 1. 
 59.  The second paragraph of each of these provisions, like that of Article 8, allows the state 
certain leeway to protect other rights and interests by imposing some limitations on privacy, free 
expression, and property rights.  But that does not eliminate the affirmative obligation created by the 
first paragraph.  See, e.g., Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010) 
(alluding to affirmative obligations under Article 1). 
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C. Von Hannover and the Balance of Free Expression and Privacy 
The right to free expression is often a significant limitation on IP 
rights, including rights of celebrities.  The ECHR’s treatment of the free 
expression argument in Von Hannover demonstrates that under the 
Convention, speech in a commercial context may not be given 
particularly strong protection.60  Since many IP cases implicate free 
speech concerns, this development would favor the rights of IP owners 
over the rights of unauthorized users.  On the other hand, an affirmative 
obligation to promote freedom of expression could be invoked to create 
IP rights that further such expression. 
The Von Hannover decision may not appear to be an IP case at all; 
it could be viewed as an ordinary tort case.  Even without the right of 
publicity overtones, however, the case would be of interest to IP lawyers 
for several reasons.  The decision made clear that the right of free 
expression does not trump other rights under the Convention.  When two 
rights are potentially at odds, as in Von Hannover, the court must 
balance them, giving due regard for the ECHR’s view of the general 
societal values at stake.  Although, as discussed further below, the 
ECHR often gives member state decisions a certain degree of 
deference—called a “margin of appreciation”61—in the case of Von 
Hannover, the court showed very little inclination to defer to the German 
courts’ own balancing of the rights, even though the balance struck by 
the German courts was not patently unreasonable.62  Moreover, the right 
to know about (and perhaps make use of) facts of a celebrity’s life was 
expressly deemed to have relatively little weight in the free expression 
balance.63 
Subsequently, the ECHR expounded on the role of free expression 
in several cases involving celebrity photographs, including a second case 
 
 60.  Id. at ¶¶ 59, 63-64.  In addition to its statements in Von Hannover, the ECHR’s attitude 
toward commercial speech can be found in some of its unfair competition cases.  See generally 
Maya Hertig Randall, Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Subordinate or Equal?, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53 (2006). 
 61.  See infra Part IV.  Cf. A v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, ¶ 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 
2009); Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, ¶77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10, 2007) (Grand 
Chamber). 
 62.  The margin of appreciation can also reflect the ECHR’s view of the existence of a 
European consensus on the issue.  See Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 124 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011) (granting a greater margin of appreciation to the state’s refusal to act where 
there was no European consensus on whether the press must give advance notice of intent to publish 
a story about a prominent figure). 
 63.  Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, ¶65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004.  
Accord Mosley, App. No. 48009/08 at ¶114. 
14
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brought by Princess Caroline (and her husband).64  In one case, the 
ECHR found a violation of Article 10, where a newspaper was prevented 
from publishing a picture of an actor together with articles concerning 
his arrest and guilty plea on charges of drug possession.65  But this case 
involved the press’s oversight function vis a vis the criminal process and 
can be distinguished from Von Hannover (no. 1).  In another case, the 
ECHR upheld a decision of the British House of Lords66 that prevented 
publication of photographs of model Naomi Campbell arriving at a drug 
rehabilitation facility.67  In a second Von Hannover case, the ECHR 
upheld the German courts’ decision to allow publication of a picture of 
Princess Caroline and her husband at St. Moritz together with an article 
about her then-ailing father and the contrast with her sister’s decision to 
stay with the father.68  The ECHR propounded five factors relevant to 
the balancing process: (1) the contribution to a debate of general interest; 
(2) how well known the person is and what is the subject of the report; 
(3) prior conduct of the person concerned; (4) content, form and 
consequences of the publication; and (5) circumstances in which the 
photos were taken.69  Although these factors clarify the proper 
methodology, they do not materially alter the boundaries of protection 
from the first Von Hannover decision.  In the second Von Hannover 
case, the ECHR stressed the informative value of the article and noted 
that the German courts had prevented publication of photographs that 
were less informative.70  Thus, the impact of the first Von Hannover 
decision apparently was to narrow Germany’s previously broader 
tolerance of press intrusion into the lives of public figures. 
Although the later cases stressed the importance of the press in a 
democratic society, they do not appear to have markedly altered the 
 
 64.  Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012) 
(Grand Chamber); Axel Springer A.G. v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012) 
(Grand Chamber); MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 18, 
2011). 
 65.  Axel Springer, at ¶¶ 10-15, 110-111.  The actor’s name was not revealed by the court; he 
was referred to as person X. 
 66.  In 2009, the House of Lords was replaced by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
as the supreme judicial body of the country.  See History, THE SUPREME COURT (UK), 
www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 67.  MGN Ltd., App. No. 39401/04 at ¶10, 156.  The ECHR did find a violation of Article 10 
in another aspect of the case—the amount of “success fees” (legal fees) of Naomi Campbell 
imposed on MGN.  Id. at ¶¶218-220.  Cf. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. May 10, 2011) (declining to mandate that celebrities be informed in advance of any potentially 
damaging publications). 
 68.  Von Hannover (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 at ¶¶ 15-20. 
 69.  Id. at ¶¶ 108-113. 
 70.  Id. at ¶¶ 118-126. 
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perception that entertainment news is considered of lesser value than 
other news.71 
IV. THE DEFERENCE AFFORDED MEMBER STATES: MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is the ECHR’s mechanism 
for affording deference to the state in the manner of its implementation 
of the Convention.  The doctrine is fraught with potential difficulties.72  
If too much deference is given, it undercuts the universality of human 
rights guarantees and could allow countries to carry out seriously unfair 
policies that flout the spirit of the Convention.  On the other hand, 
refusing to give deference in some circumstances cannot undermine 
important social and cultural values embedded in the legal norms of 
member countries.  In practice, the doctrine appears to be unevenly 
applied.  As discussed above, in the first Von Hannover case, the ECHR 
did not afford Germany any meaningful margin of appreciation for the 
German courts’ balancing of privacy and free expression.  Yet, in other 
privacy cases, the court has afforded countries a significant margin of 
appreciation.73  The ECHR has identified one factor as being particularly 
 
 71.  MGN, Ltd., App. No. 39401/04 at ¶¶ 139, 143 (“The Court considers the publication of 
the photographs and articles, the sole purpose of which is to satisfy the curiosity of a particular 
readership regarding the details of a public figure’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to 
any debate of general interest to society.”); Axel Springer A.G., App. No. 39954/08 at ¶ 78 
(“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society.”), Id. 
at ¶¶ 82-84 (discussing limits on Article 10, particularly those of Article 8).  The ECHR continued 
this trend in Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013), where it rejected a 
claim that France violated Article 10 by prosecuting the petitioners for posting photographs of a 
fashion show online.  The Court specifically noted that France’s actions were consistent with 
protecting the intellectual property of the fashion creators (fashions are protected by French 
copyright law), and that the state has greater leeway where the expression is for a commercial 
purpose. Id. at ¶¶ 39-42.  See Hertel v. Switzerland, Case No. 59/1997/843/1049,  ¶ 47 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Aug. 25, 1998) (while finding a violation of Article 10, Court said “a margin of appreciation is 
particularly essential in commercial matters, especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that 
of unfair competition.”). 
 72.  For further discussions of the issue, see, e.g., Paul Gallagher, The European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Margin of Appreciation (University College Dublin Law, Criminology & 
Socio-legal Studies, Working Research Paper No. 52/2011, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1982661); Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the 
Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 
15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391 (2001). 
 73.  See, e.g., Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/08, ¶¶ 79, 81, 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
10, 2007) (state’s decision concerning destruction of stored embryos conceived via in vitro 
fertilization given “wide” margin of appreciation); Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, ¶¶ 105-
108 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2010) (state afforded margin of appreciation regarding same-sex 
marriage); A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579, ¶ 185 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2010) (state 
16
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important in the margin of appreciation—the existence or lack of a 
European consensus on the matter.74  Also identified as factors are the 
importance of the right to “an individual’s existence or identity,” which 
narrows the margin, and the need “to strike a balance between 
competing private and public interests or Convention rights,” which 
broadens the margin.75  But Von Hannover (no. 1) involved just such a 
competing rights circumstances with little evidence of a margin of 
appreciation.76  And in A, B, C v. Ireland,77 the ECHR deferred to 
Ireland’s law on abortion rights despite an apparent European consensus 
to the contrary.78 
In property rights cases, there is a greater mention of the margin of 
appreciation, and some cases indicate a wider margin exists in such 
situations.79  However, the implementation of the margin of appreciation 
has not been particularly consistent in property rights cases, either.  In 
two cases where a retroactive application of law deprived applicants of 
certain legal claims, the ECHR found violations of Article 1, despite 
acknowledging the margin of appreciation given to the state.80  In 
another case, a Chamber of the court found a violation where the 
applicant was deprived of its property by Britain’s adverse possession 
law, noting that the “wide” margin of appreciation may be overcome by 
a lack of “fair balance” and proportionality.81  The Grand Chamber, 
 
afforded margin of appreciation regarding right to abortion). 
 74.  See, e.g., Schalk, App. No. 30141/04 at ¶ 98; Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
48009/08 ¶ 124 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011). 
 75.  Evans, App. No. 6339/08 at ¶ 77. 
 76.  In the second Von Hannover case, there was a more extensive discussion of the margin of 
appreciation, particularly in a competing rights situation.  Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. 
No. 40660/08, ¶¶104-07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012).  Ultimately, the German courts’ balancing 
was upheld in the second instance.  Id. at ¶¶ 124-26. 
 77.  App. No. 25579 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2010). 
 78.  Id. at ¶ 235 (noting the existence of a consensus), Id. at ¶ 241 (finding Irish restrictions 
on abortion within its margin of appreciation). 
 79.  See, e.g., Paeffgen GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, and 
21770/05, at 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (rejecting admissibility of complaints regarding laws relating 
to the improper use of domain names); Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, ¶ 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Sept. 28, 1995) (rejecting challenge to Italy’s rent control law that deprived applicants of possession 
of their apartments for long periods of time; court noted the “wide margin of appreciation” given the 
state).  See also Barrow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42735/02, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 22, 2006) 
(“The margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic 
policies should be a wide one.”). 
 80.  Pressos Compania Navieca, S.A. v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶¶ 37-39, 43 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 20, 1995); Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶¶ 83, 90-91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 
2005) (noting a lack of proportionality). 
 81.  J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, ¶¶ 44, 46, 70-75 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2005).  See also Hutten-Czapeska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶¶ 223-225 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 17, 2006) (Polish rent control law violates Article 1) (Grand Chamber). 
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however, reversed, finding that the interference in this case was not 
disproportionate and that the system of land ownership was one in which 
the government was entitled to an especially wide margin of 
appreciation.82  Other cases also evidenced a greater willingness to defer 
to the member state’s law.83  The application of the doctrine is, 
therefore, somewhat unpredictable.  Its operation may be contrasted with 
United States equal protection doctrine where the level of deference or 
scrutiny is more predictable and the outcomes, while not entirely 
predictable, are at least somewhat predictable based on the level of 
scrutiny.84  However, it is worth noting that the ECHR follows a 
somewhat analogous system when assessing the margin of appreciation 
afforded under Article 14, the Convention’s antidiscrimination 
provision.85 
Given the relative unpredictability of the outcome even when a 
state has a wide margin of appreciation, it is difficult to assess whether 
the ECHR would defer to the state’s legislative process (or lack thereof) 
when deciding many of the issues discussed here. 
V.  CREATING CELEBRITY RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 8 
Despite the fact that Article 8 appears to rest more on dignity 
 
 82.  J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd., App. No. 44302/02 at ¶ 83 (“Such arrangements fall within the 
State’s margin of appreciation, unless they give rise to results which are so anomalous as to render 
the legislation unacceptable.”).  One dissent, on behalf of five judges, found the application in a 
case of a registered owner to be disproportionate.  Id. at ¶ 21 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Rozakis, Bratza, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Gyulumyan and Šikuta).  A second dissent, on behalf of two 
judges, found both a lack of proportionality and a failure of the adverse possession law to be in the 
general interest.  Id. (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides Joined By Judge Kovler). 
 83.  E.g., Spadea, App. No. 12868/87 at ¶¶ 28, 40 (rent control); Benet Czech, spol. S.R.O. v. 
The Czech Republic, App. No. 31555/05,¶¶ 35-40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 2010) (in seizure of 
company bank accounts pursuant to a criminal investigation of a company officer; “the Courts will 
respect the State authorities’ judgment as to what is in the general interest unless that judgment is 
manifestly without reasonable foundation.”); Air Canada v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18465/91, 
¶¶ 38, 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 5, 1995) (temporary seizure of airplane plus payment  before any 
hearing). 
 84.  Race-based distinctions receive the highest scrutiny; economically based conditions 
require only a “rational basis.”  One exception may be discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
where the Supreme Court uses a rational basis test, but has recently struck down governmental 
actions.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado initiative that 
removed specific protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (invalidating laws against homosexual sodomy).  But cf. Citizens for 
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding Nebraska’s constitutional 
initiative precluding recognition of same sex marriage, civil union, or other similar same sex 
relationships). 
 85.  See B v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36571/06, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2012) (wide 
margin of appreciation in areas of social and economic policy). 
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interests than commercial interests, one can postulate something akin to 
a true right of publicity arising from this provision.  As interpreted in 
Von Hannover, Article 8 provides a suitable foundation, by imposing an 
affirmative obligation on countries to protect privacy rights and by 
limiting the legitimate sphere of press freedom regarding celebrities.  
The ECHR may expand the right to privacy to protect a celebrity against 
unwanted merchandising on the grounds that it dishonors the celebrity’s 
name.  In many countries in Europe the right to privacy is imbued with 
both dignity interests and rights of commercial exploitation.86  The 
ECHR could hold that these personality rights inform the interpretation 
of Article 8 and require a broader right to privacy, one that allows the 
individual wide ranging control over various forms of commercialization 
of his or her image.87 
The simplest extension would be to a use that falsely implies that 
the celebrity endorses a particular product or service.88  Many celebrities 
certainly would view such a false endorsement as an indignity.89  Other 
unauthorized uses, such as merchandising, might also be deemed 
undignified and therefore invasive of a broad notion of privacy.90  Von 
 
 86.  In Von Hannover, Princess Caroline brought a claim in the German courts under a 
provision of German copyright law, as well as privacy laws.  Georgios Zagouras, Commercial 
Exploitation of the Personality and License Requirements for Satiric Advertisements Under German 
Law, 42 I.I.C. 74, 76-82 (2011) (discussing German cases on use of celebrities in advertising).  See 
generally Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right to 
One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 681-86 (2002); Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, 
The French Right of Image: an Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L.REV. 511, 516-17 (1998); Stephen R. Barnett, “The Right to One’s Own Image”: Publicity 
and Privacy Rights in the United States and Spain, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (1999); Susanne 
Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: a Comparative Analysis, 19 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 479, 479-80, 500-503 (1999). 
 87.  In Burghartz v. Switzerland, App. No. 16213/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1994), the court 
held that Article 8 gives a person an interest in his name, such that the state cannot arbitrarily deny 
him the right to choose how his surname will be designated (married man wanted to use his wife’s 
family name, but precede it with his own).  “As a means of personal identification and of linking to 
a family, a person’s name nonetheless concerns his or her private and family life.”  Id. at ¶ 24.  
Although this case does not establish that a pecuniary interest in one’s name is a privacy right, it is 
not a large leap to say that a deceptive use of one’s name (e.g., a false endorsement) would 
implicate a privacy right. 
 88.  The U.K. already has some precedent in this area.  See Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002] 
EWHC (Ch) [367]. 
 89.  See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 976 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting jury award of 
“$200,000 for injury to [Waits’] peace, happiness and feelings.”). 
 90.  See Zagouras, Commercial Exploitation, supra note 86, at 82-85 (discussing 
merchandising cases).  In Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 
2011), the ECHR refused to mandate that member countries require a newspaper to give advance 
notice of any publications relating to the private life of a celebrity.  Id. at ¶¶ 125-129.  However, the 
ECHR was highly critical of the publications in question (which had been successfully sued in 
19
Welkowitz: Privatizing Human Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 3 - WELKOWITZ (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/2013  10:13 AM 
694 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:675 
Hannover’s requirement that the country give a private civil right of 
action to protect the claim creates the basis for a private civil action. 
The argument in favor of a strong publicity right, particularly one 
grounded in Article 8, is not without some contrary precedent.  For 
example, in Vorsina v. Russia,91 decided just months before Von 
Hannover, the ECHR refused the application of the granddaughters of a 
man whose portrait was used on bottles of beer.  The court found that by 
giving the portrait in question to a local museum, the family “had 
agreed, in principle, that the portrait may be seen by others.”92  The 
court also found that the brewery’s use did not dishonor the family.93  
This case involved a man who had been dead for several decades.  That 
fact may have been important in the court’s decision (though it was not 
expressly mentioned in the court’s analysis).  The court may have been 
uncertain about how to handle such inherited claims, and how to allocate 
“ownership” of the right after more than one generation.  Moreover, the 
court’s finding that the use was not undignified indicates that a less 
dignified use (and the court did not define what that would be) might 
have led to a different result.  On the other hand, its statement that the 
family had allowed the portrait to be seen publicly points to privacy, as 
opposed to simple dignity, as a basis for Article 8 claims. 
Moreover, as discussed above, there is at least the potential for 
Article 10, the free expression provision, to enter the picture.  In addition 
to the Axel Springer case, in Karhuvaara v. Finland,94 the ECHR 
recognized that Article 10 has some force in right to privacy matters.  
The court held that Finland violated Article 10 by criminally punishing a 
newspaper for publishing a story about a criminal trial, and identifying 
the defendant by name and by the fact that he was the husband of a 
member of Parliament.95  But the applicability of this judgment to 
 
British courts) and was not completely unsympathetic to the plaintiff’s plea.  Id. at ¶¶ 130-131.  
Granting a right of publicity against a commercial use of a celebrity’s identity seems less drastic 
than granting a prepublication right of notice, even if the latter is tempered by a “public interest” 
exemption.  See id. at ¶ 131.  In Mosley, the ECHR was concerned about inhibiting free and open 
debate.  Id. at ¶ 132.  However, the court’s view of the photographs in Von Hannover and MGN, 
Ltd. suggests that it would not view commercial uses of celebrity identities as contributing to a 
useful debate. 
 91. App. No. 66801/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 5, 2004). 
 92.  Id. at *5.  The Court did not consider the merits in a normal fashion; it ruled the 
application inadmissible, meaning it appeared to be “manifestly ill-founded.” 
 93.  Id.  It was not clear that the court was denying a claim under Article 8; it began this 
section by saying “assuming that Article 8” applies.  The court did not consider Article 1 of the First 
Protocol. 
 94.  App. No. 53678/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004). 
 95.  Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.   
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private civil actions must be tempered by the court’s references to the 
requirement of proportionality of the punishment96 and the heavy fines 
imposed by the government.97  Moreover, the case involved a political 
figure, not a mere celebrity.98  Thus, like Axel Springer, it can easily be 
distinguished from Von Hannover. 
Another attempt to expand the right to privacy was turned aside by 
the ECHR when it refused to impose an obligation on the media to 
notify the subject in advance of a news report.99  Such advance notice 
would permit the subject to seek a preliminary injunction against 
publication; the ECHR recognized that this posed potential problems 
with Article 10’s free press guarantee and that there was no consensus 
among European countries on the need for such advance notice.100 
On the other hand, these two cases did not involve endorsement or 
merchandising uses of the celebrity’s identity.  Thus, the balance more 
easily tipped in the direction of Article 10 freedoms.  In a commercial 
context, that balance may shift.101 
In the United States, the right to privacy has morphed into a right of 
publicity, which is more like a property right and less like a dignity 
interest—it is assignable and, in most states, inheritable.  The right 
described here under Article 8 is more like the U.S. right to privacy, in 
that the attention is unwanted.  It is not a question of who obtains the 
commercial value of the celebrity’s identity, but a matter of precluding 
the use entirely.  In a later section of this paper, I postulate a more 
property-like right of publicity under the Convention, but one that is 
attached primarily to Article 1, First Protocol. 
VI. THE EXTENSION OF IP RIGHTS THROUGH ARTICLE 10 OF THE 
CONVENTION 
It can be—and has been—argued that the application of human 
rights standards is a positive development for intellectual property, in 
that it “humanizes” intellectual property rights, and forces courts to 
consider limitations based on the rights of those other than intellectual 
 
 96.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
 97.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
 98.  Id. at ¶ 52.  See Axel Springer A.G. v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, ¶ 111 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Feb. 7, 2012) (Grand Chamber) (prohibition on publishing an article and photo of an actor who was 
arrested on cocaine related charges in a public place violated Article 10). 
 99.  Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 132 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011). 
 100.  Id. at ¶¶124, 129. 
 101.  Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08, ¶¶39-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013); Hertel v. 
Switzerland, Case No. 59/19977/843/104, ¶47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 25, 1998). 
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property rights holders.102  However, in view of the ECHR’s approach to 
free press, the degree to which the application of the Convention would 
humanize European intellectual property law is likely to vary widely, 
depending on the country in question. 
But Article 10 could be used as more than a limitation.  In theory, it 
might be the basis for extending IP rights as well.  As a reminder, the 
pertinent language of Article 10 is as follows (with some emphasis 
supplied): 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.103 
Building on the idea that the Convention creates affirmative as well 
as negative obligations, Article 10 could support an expansion of 
copyright.104  If, as is sometimes postulated in the U.S., copyright is an 
engine of free expression, one could argue for a robust copyright regime 
as a means of allowing one to “impart information and ideas.”105  No 
doubt this right would have to reflect a balance of the rights of others to 
free expression, and perhaps even some notion of proportionality, which 
is a common feature of ECHR jurisprudence.106 
VII.  EXTENDING IP RIGHTS THROUGH ARTICLE 1—FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 
Having laid an appropriate base for the application of the 
Convention to private disputes, we can now return to Article 1, First 
Protocol, as a more formidable foundation for the creation and/or 
extension of IP rights.  Through a series of cases, the ECHR has 
established a methodology for analyzing problems under Article 1.  The 
first task is to lay out that methodology.  Once the framework has been 
 
 102.  See generally Christophe Gieger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The 
Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 I.I.C. 371 
(2006); A. Kampelman Sanders, Unfair Competition Law and the European Court of Human 
Rights: The Case of Hertel v. Switzerland and Beyond, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 305 (1999). 
 103.  Convention, supra note 9, at art. 10 (emphasis added). 
 104.  See Appleby v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44306/98, ¶¶ 39-40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6, 
2003) (indicating the possibility of affirmative rights under Article 10).  See also infra Section 
VIII.D., discussing the creation and expansion of copyright through Article 1. 
 105.  Cf. Lea Shaver and Caterina Spanga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On 
Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637 (2010) (discussing use of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a basis for copyright-like protection). 
 106.  The concept of proportionality is discussed in more detail infra in Section VII. A. 
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established, we shall discuss a variety of possible IP rights that could 
flow from Article 1. 
A. The General Principles of the ECHR’s Article 1 Methodology 
As the ECHR has noted on more than one occasion,107 Article 1 has 
two paragraphs that express three separate, but related principles.  The 
first sentence of the first paragraph states a general principle, that one 
has a right to enjoy one’s possessions without interference.108  The 
second principle is stated in the second sentence, that one may not be 
deprived of one’s possessions, except under specified conditions.109  The 
third principle is contained in the second paragraph: the state can control 
the use of one’s property, provided it complies with the conditions of the 
paragraph, namely, that the control be consistent with the public 
interest.110  The second and third principles are regarded as specific 
instances of the first principle.111  Consequently, the first principle stands 
by itself; a violation of Article 1 can occur even if there is no total 
deprivation,112 and, apparently, even in the absence of an attempt by the 
state to control the use of the property.113  On the other hand, not all 
“interferences” with property under the first principle will constitute 
violations of Article 1.  That principle also requires the state to strike a 
balance between protecting the individual and protecting “the general 
interest of the community.”114 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Perdigão v. Portugal, App. No. 24768/06,  ¶ 57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2010) 
(Grand Chamber); Benet Czech, spol. S.R.O. v. The Czech Republic, App. No. 31555/05, ¶ 30 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 2010); Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) 
(Grand Chamber); Sporrong v. Sweden, App. No. 7151/75; 7152/75, ¶ 61 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 
1982).  See Hermann v. Germany, App. No. 9300/07,  ¶ 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2012) (Grand 
Chamber) (the second paragraph of Article 1 is to be interpreted “in the light of the principle laid 
down in the first sentence of the Article.”).  
 108.  Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, art. 1. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.  This requirement appears to preclude controls that are intended to favor one person or 
a small group of people.  Support for this argument also comes from a principle added by the court, 
that is, one of balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the society.  See, e.g., 
Perdigão v. Portugal, App. No. 24768/06, ¶78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2010) (Grand Chamber). 
 111.  See, e.g., Maurice, App. No. 11810/03 at ¶ 78.  
 112.  See Sporrong, App. No. 7151/75; 7152/75 at ¶¶ 67-74. 
 113.  Id. at ¶ 65 (finding the second paragraph inapplicable).  This would support the idea that 
affirmative state action is not a prerequisite to the application of this Article. 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 69.  In Sporrong, the city of Stockholm had been issued permits to take 
applicants’ land, permits that were extended for many years but never executed.  Id. at ¶¶ 9-30.  
This was found to violate the first principle because the delays reduced the land’s value 
(constituting an interference with its enjoyment) and the inflexibility of the process provided no 
means to ameliorate the injury as the process dragged on.  Id. at ¶¶ 70-74.  This was a close 
decision; the vote on this issue was 10-9.  Eight dissenters felt that the second paragraph of Article 1 
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Furthermore, the state’s ability to control the use of property under 
the second paragraph of Article 1, even if the regulation is in the general 
interest, is limited by a principle of proportionality.  The ECHR has 
stated that there must be “a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be reali[z]ed,”115 
which amounts to striking a balance between the interest of the state and 
that of the individual.116  That is, the state may not place an undue burden 
on an individual, even to further a goal that is in the general interest.117  
Compensation by the state for the interference with the individual’s 
property interest is a factor in that proportionality.118  When reviewing 
whether the state’s action is in the general interest, the ECHR normally 
grants the state “a wide margin of appreciation.”119  However, the 
principle of proportionality still limits the state’s authority to control 
property, and, by extension, its ability to permit others to interfere with 
the owner’s enjoyment of the property.120 
The cases enunciating these principles involved direct state action 
against an individual’s property interest.  Other cases indicate that an 
affirmative right that requires the state to afford protection against 
private interference with property also exists under Article 1.121  A 
 
was applicable, i.e. the permits constituted control of the use of the property by the state.  But they 
believed that the control was within the bounds of the “general interest” and therefore not in 
violation of Article 1.  Id.  (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Zekia, Cremona, Thór 
Vilkyálmsson, Lagergren, Sir Vincent Evans, MacDonald, Bernhardt and Gersing with regard to 
Article 1 (of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)).  Id. at 28.  The ninth dissenter indicated that the majority was 
recognizing too absolute a right in property and was insufficiently crediting the public interest.  Id. 
at 40 (Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walsh). 
 115. Agosi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9118/80, ¶ 52. (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 1986).  Cf. 
Iatridis v. Greece, App. No. 31107/96, ¶ 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 25, 1999) (because the interference 
violated Greek law, no need to determine whether “a fair balance has been struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights.”); Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. 
Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 149 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005) (Grand Chamber). 
 116.  Agosi, App. No. 9118/80 at ¶ 54. 
 117.  Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 86 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005). 
 118.  Id. at ¶ 87. 
 119.  See supra Part IV for a discussion of the margin of appreciation. 
 120.  The principle of proportionality is not limited to Article 1.  The ECHR has invoked the 
principle in relation to several other Articles, including Articles 8 and 10.  See generally Alastair 
Mobray, A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289 (2010).  The notion of “fair balance” also is not unique to 
the Convention.  See Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 1 (2010). 
 121.  Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010) (“The 
boundaries between the state’s positive and negative obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
do not lend themselves to precise definition.”).  See supra Part III.B.  See also J. A. Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30, 2007) (Grand Chamber) 
24
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country’s property law (or tort law as it relates to harm to property) 
reflects, albeit perhaps indirectly, the country’s level of control over the 
use of property.  A prohibition on theft, for example, reflects the 
country’s goal that certain types of interference with property ownership 
by private parties will not be countenanced.  A tort action for conversion 
reflects a similar goal.  A country’s tolerance for unauthorized uses of 
other forms of property by individuals also reflects the country’s 
decisions concerning legitimate uses of property.122  These decisions 
could be weighed using the same principle of proportionality as in cases 
of direct governmental interference with property.  The 
affirmative/negative distinction need not change the basic framework 
used by the ECHR in property rights cases.  Thus, the questions in each 
example posited below will include whether there is a possession at all, 
what conduct would constitute an interference with the possession, and 
whether the state may allow that interference in accordance with the 
general interest, in the absence of any compensation for the interference.  
This last question must include consideration of the proportionality 
between the general interest and the burden placed on the individual. 
B. “Possessions,” “Interference,” and Private Rights 
The application of Article 1 begins with a simple question—does 
the claimant have a “possession”?  The ECHR has stated that 
[T]he concept of “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an 
autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of 
physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can 
also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the 
purposes of this provision.123 
Intangible property, including intellectual property, qualifies as a 
possession.124  Even interests that do not rise to the level of true 
intangible property can be possessions.125 
 
(allowing a party to invoke adverse possession law against registered owner of property raises an 
issue under Article 1 notwithstanding lack of direct state action). 
 122.  See J. A. Pye, App. No. 44302/02. 
 123.  Iatridis v. Greece, App. No. 31107/96, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999).  Accord Paeffgen 
GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, at 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007). 
 124.  Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2008). 
 125.  Anheuser-Busch Corp. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶¶ 76-78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 
2007) (Grand Chamber) (application to register trademark deemed a possession within Article 1); 
Paeffgen GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, at 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (right to use domain 
name as a possession); B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36571/06, ¶¶ 38-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 
2012) (where government reduced future benefits to recoup past overpayment, right to future 
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It is not sufficient to postulate property rights, or “possessions.”  
The Convention protects against an “interference” with the enjoyment of 
one’s possessions, and one must ask how one can fit a case against a 
country (a prerequisite to a suit in the ECHR) within the usual private 
framework of intellectual property rights.  As discussed above, this 
obstacle may be overcome by Von Hannover’s insistence that a country 
take affirmative steps to protect the right in question, even providing a 
private cause of action as necessary.  Although Article 1 and Article 8 
protect different interests, it is logical for the ECHR to extend the 
affirmative obligation of the state to the rights granted under Article 1.  
A close examination of these Articles reveals several similarities in 
structure.  Both Articles begin with a general statement of rights that do 
not mention interference by the state.  Those rights are of a nature that 
are often protected by tort law—invasion of privacy or conversion of 
property.  The Articles each follow with a subsection permitting a 
certain level of state interference with the general right in order to 
further important state interests. 
Although it does not direct the member state to create a private 
right of action, the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom126 
illustrates how a private dispute can implicate Article 1.  In Pye, the 
applicant company was the registered owner of a piece of land in Great 
Britain, which it leased for a specified period to its neighbors127 for 
grazing.  At the end of the lease period, the company refused to extend 
the grazing rights period, but the neighbors continued to use the land.128  
After using the land without authorization for twelve years the neighbors 
applied to register a claim to the land under the British statutes 
governing adverse possession.129  This was granted, and it divested Pye 
of its claim to the land.130  The British courts (with some apparent 
reluctance)131 upheld the neighbors’ claim under the relevant British 
 
benefits were a possession, though overpayment made because of applicant’s misrepresentation is 
not a possession); see Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, ¶¶ 126-127 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 
2004) (applicant built house on land belonging to the government without permission; land was not 
a possession even if applicant could have obtained it, but dwelling was a possession).  
 126.  App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2005). 
 127.  Id. at ¶ 9.  The neighbors were an individual family. 
 128.  Id. at ¶ 11.  For a time, the parties exchanged correspondence concerning the neighbors’ 
desire to continue using the land.  However, this contact ceased after a few years. Id.  
 129.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
 130.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
 131.  The reluctance stemmed from the fact that Pye’s ownership was registered and thus 
public record.  The courts believed that the primary interest served by adverse possession—certainty 
of title—was only marginally advanced by allowing adverse possession against a registered owner.  
Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. 
26
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statutes.  However, Pye appealed to the ECHR, which initially ruled in 
its favor under Article 1.  The Chamber specifically rejected the British 
government’s argument that, because this was a private dispute not 
involving governmental action, Article 1 was not applicable.132  It then 
ruled that a violation of Article 1 had occurred.133  The case was 
transferred to the Grand Chamber, which, by a vote of 10-7, reversed the 
finding of a violation of Article 1.134  However, the Grand Chamber 
accepted that Article 1 applies to cases between private individuals, at 
least where the government is responsible for the application of its law 
to the case.135  Subsequently, the ECHR indicated that Article 1 does, in 
fact, contain affirmative obligations.136  Extending affirmative 
obligations to property rights makes Article 1, First Protocol, the 
foundation of many possible IP rights.  The combination of treating 
various intangibles of value as possessions, and the obligation of 
member countries to provide a private right of action to prevent 
interference with a possession, is a potentially powerful one. 
C. The Potential of Article 1 Further Revealed: Anheuser-Busch v. 
Portugal 
Perhaps ironically, the potential power of Article 1 for IP rights was 
revealed in a decision that rejected an attempt to invoke Article 1 in 
support of an IP right.  The case was part of a long-running dispute 
between brewer Anhueser-Busch and a Czech company over the rights 
to the name Budweiser.  The Czech company claimed to have a 
geographic indication (“GI”) in the name (as translated from Czech to 
German).  Anheuser-Busch filed an application for trademark 
registration in Portugal, which the Czech company opposed.  Although 
Anheuser-Busch eventually received a registration, it was later cancelled 
by the Portuguese courts on the grounds that a treaty between Portugal 
and Czechoslovakia (as it was then called) required Portugal to 
 
 132.  Id. at ¶¶ 50-52, 56.   
 133.  It found that the application of the adverse possession statute to a registered owner 
imposed a disproportionate burden relative to the governmental interest involved.  Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.  
See also Kanala v. Slovakia, App. No. 57239/00, ¶¶ 64-65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (allowing 
applicant’s property interest to be sold at foreclosure for far less than appraised value imposed 
disproportionate burden). 
 134.  J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, ¶ 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 
30, 2007) (Grand Chamber). 
 135.  Id. at ¶ 57. 
 136.  Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010) (“The 
boundaries between the state’s positive and negative obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
do not lend themselves to precise definition.”) (emphasis added). 
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recognize the Czech company’s GI.137  Anheuser-Busch applied for 
relief to the ECHR, claiming a violation of Article 1.  In an initial 
chamber judgment, the ECHR rejected the application, asserting that an 
application to register that did not ripen into a final, non-appealable 
registration could not be considered a “possession.”138  Anheuser-Busch 
then appealed to the Grand Chamber of the court.  The Grand Chamber 
also held that there was no violation of Article 1, but on somewhat 
different grounds.  Contrary to the decision of the Chamber, the Grand 
Chamber decided that an application for a trademark registration is a 
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1.139  However, the judges 
then decided that there had not been an “interference” with Anheuser-
Busch’s right to peaceful enjoyment of its possession.140  The court 
viewed Anheuser-Busch’s complaint as an attack on the correctness, as a 
matter of domestic law, of the Portuguese Supreme Court’s decision 
concerning the relative priority of rights between Anheuser-Busch and 
its Czech adversary.141  Thus, the court ruled that it could only review 
the decision to the extent of determining that the Portuguese court’s 
decision was not arbitrary “or otherwise manifestly unreasonable.”142  
Pointing out that Anheuser-Busch had had ample opportunity to present 
its claim to the Portuguese courts, and noting that the questions of law 
involved—the effect of any preexisting rights of the Czech company and 
the effect of the 1986 bilateral agreement relating to the GI—were not 
clear on the face of the laws themselves, the ECHR stated that it was for 
the Portuguese courts to decide these issues and that the ECHR would 
not disturb the decision.143  Two judges dissented from this decision, 
arguing that, once it was decided that an application was a possession, 
the retroactive application of the 1986 agreement would constitute an 
 
 137.  This is a somewhat simplified recitation of the events, which were rather complicated. 
 138.  Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2005) 
(the “Chamber opinion”). 
 139.  Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) 
(Grand Chamber) (the “Grand Chamber opinion”).  Two judges concurred in the result, but 
disagreed with the Grand Chamber’s rationale.  They argued that, although intellectual property 
(including a trademark registration) is generally within the protection of Article 1, an application is 
not.  Id. (Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Steiner and Hajiyev).  Two other judges dissented.  Id. 
(Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch and Cabral Barreto). 
 140.  Id. at ¶ 87. 
 141.  Id. at ¶ 83. 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. at ¶¶ 84-86.  The Portuguese government made an analogous argument to the 
Chamber below, to the effect that action by the ECHR would amount to an appeal on an issue of 
domestic law. 
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interference.144 
From the standpoint of intellectual property rights, the ruling that a 
trademark application, which is even more ephemeral than a registration, 
constitutes a “possession” is very important.  The Grand Chamber noted 
that “a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining an ‘asset’ may also enjoy 
the protection of Article 1.”145  It further noted several cases in which IP 
rights were regarded as possessions, and held that IP rights “as such” are 
protected by Article 1.146  With regard to the case of Anheuser-Busch, 
the Grand Chamber noted in particular the pecuniary value of a 
trademark registration application.147  As discussed below, the near 
equation of pecuniary value with a possession is potentially very 
expansive in the area of intellectual property.148 
VIII.  USING ARTICLE 1 TO CREATE OR EXPAND IP RIGHTS: EXAMPLES 
A.  Possible Trademark and Related Rights Developments from Human 
Rights 
A good starting point for the discussion of expanding IP rights is an 
IP right already recognized to implicate Article 1, namely trademark 
law.  Anheuser-Busch made clear that trademarks, and even applications 
to register trademarks, are “possessions” under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol.149  Anheuser-Busch involved an outright revocation of the 
 
 144.  Id. at ¶ 5 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch and Cabral Barreto). 
 145.  Id. at ¶ 65 (Grand Chamber opinion). 
 146.  Id. at ¶¶ 67-72. 
 147.  Id. at ¶ 76 (“Such applications may give rise to a variety of legal transactions, such as a 
sale or license agreement for consideration, and possess—or are capable of possessing—a 
substantial financial value.”).  The Chamber had also noted the financial value of the application, 
but did not deem that sufficient to make it a possession.  Id. at ¶¶ 47-48 (Chamber opinion). 
 148.  The Grand Chamber’s disposition of the remainder of the case made an analysis of 
whether there was an actionable “interference” unnecessary. 
 149.  That trademark rights are considered important rights under the Convention also is 
illustrated by the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Nijs v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 15497/89 (Eur. Comm’n. Hum. Rts. 1992).  The applicants, a pharmacist, a 
doctor, and a manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals, claimed that a limitation on the manner in 
which doctors could prescribe drugs violated their rights under Articles 8 and 10, and Article 1 of 
the First Protocol.  Id.  The doctor wanted to prescribe in the form “‘BRAND NAME’ or equivalent 
other product according to agreed list.”  Id.  However, this was found by the local courts to violate 
the trademark rights of the brand name manufacturer under Benelux law.  Id.  The Commission 
rejected the Article 10 claim, stating that, although the regulation was an interference with free 
expression, it was within the government’s right of control as “necessary in a democratic society,” 
in order to protect another’s trademark rights.  Id.  The Commission noted that the prescription 
could be written just in the generic name of the drug.  Id.  The claims under Article 8 and Article 1 
were rejected because of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.  Id. 
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trademark registration, but found no violation of Article 1.  That result, 
however, had more to do with the procedural posture of the case than 
any substantive decision that revoking a registration is not an actionable 
interference with property rights.150  Although the second sentence of 
Article 1 refers to people being “deprived” of possessions—implying a 
complete taking—the case law clearly shows that less than complete 
takings will constitute violations if they disproportionately burden the 
individual. 
With this in mind, consider the example of trademark dilution.  
Trademark dilution is a form of infringement that does not require a 
showing of likelihood of confusion.  Thus, it gives a trademark owner 
rights in a trademark that often resemble copyright more than traditional 
trademark rights, which are grounded more in issues of consumer 
deception.  Dilution protects the distinctiveness, or uniqueness, of a 
trademark.  Thus, an unauthorized use of a mark, even on a non-
competing good, makes the mark less unique as a source identifier.  The 
owner of a registered mark could argue that under Article 1, another’s 
use of its mark that dilutes the distinctiveness of the owner’s registered 
mark constitutes an interference with the enjoyment or use of its 
property by lessening the trademark’s marketing power.  If a mark is 
diluted, the trademark owner’s property interest (i.e., the “possession”) 
is diminished in value, perhaps even destroyed.  The possibility of 
complete destruction of the trademark’s value could be most acute if the 
second use was one that tended to genericize the mark—for example, 
using “Kleenex” as a generic word for tissue.151 
Dilution raises multiple issues under Article 1.  The first problem 
may be defining at what point a potentially diluting use becomes an 
 
 150.  As noted, earlier, the ECHR seemed to view the case as though Anheuser-Busch claimed 
that Portugal unfairly applied its law retroactively to Anheuser-Busch.  Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, 
App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 82 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand Chamber).  It is noteworthy that prior 
ECHR cases did find violations of Article 1 where member countries’ laws were applied 
retroactively to deprive people of claims against the government (or even against private actors).  
See, e.g., Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01, ¶¶ 50-52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006) 
(retroactive change in law relating to loan disclosures deprived applicants of their expected statutory 
recovery relating to failure to disclose) (opinion available in French only); Maurice v. France, App. 
No. 11810/03, ¶¶ 3, 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber) (retroactive rescission of tort 
claim violates Article 1). 
 151.  If this sort of use is deemed to be an interference with the enjoyment of property rights, 
then in some cases there may have to be a balancing between the rights of the trademark owner 
under Article 1, and the rights of free expression of the second user under Article 10.  If the second 
user publishes a dictionary or a novel that uses the mark in a generic fashion, it would at least 
implicate Article 10 rights.  Whether the Article 10 rights would outweigh the Article 1 rights is not 
clear.  In many cases, the contribution of the use to a debate of public interest, as that is defined by 
the ECHR, may be very small. 
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actual interference or deprivation.  Clearly, a trademark owner would 
want to stop diluting uses before they cause measurable harm to the 
trademark.152  If the country’s trademark scheme is viewed as a means of 
controlling uses of property, then the argument is directed at the 
appropriate level of control.153 
The second problem is determining whether the interference 
violates the principle of proportionality.  The state may have valid 
reasons to allow at least a certain amount of dilution to occur.  A desire 
to permit free expression would allow various potentially tarnishing 
uses.  Tarnishing uses are ones that damage the reputation of the mark, 
such as those that connect the mark to sex or drugs.  Certain descriptive 
or nominative uses of marks may be essential, or at least useful, in every 
day discourse.154  These reasons probably would be given significant 
deference, or margin of appreciation,155 in the analysis.  But that still 
leaves the question of proportionality.  That the state’s actions 
potentially affect large numbers of people does not appear to preclude a 
violation.156  Because of the potential for significant diminishment of the 
trademark’s marketing power, the ECHR may find that allowing more 
than de minimis dilution imposes too great a burden on an individual 
trademark owner.  Moreover, the interests of those who may be diluting 
a mark will most often be commercial interests.  This may “dilute” the 
 
 152.  Cf. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (U.S. dilution statute, 
as then worded, held to require actual dilution); id. at 435-436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing 
concern about the trademark owner’s ability to stop incipient dilution under actual dilution 
standard). 
 153.  The mark owner then could argue that the state’s willingness to allow unauthorized 
diluting uses of the mark deprives mark owners of a possessory right. 
 154.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West 2013) (excluding certain descriptive and 
nominative uses from liability for dilution under U.S. law).  Descriptive uses would be uses not as a 
trademark, but as a means of describing the product—like “soft and dry” towels (assuming that 
“Soft & Dry” is a trademark for someone’s goods).  Nominative uses are uses that point to the 
trademark owner’s goods or services—such as a news report about “NIKE” shoes being made in 
third world countries—but they are not used by the second user as a trademark for his or her own 
goods. 
 155.  See supra Part IV for a discussion of the margin of appreciation.  However, comparative 
advertising, which is accepted in the United States as not being trademark infringement, is not as 
accepted in Europe.  See L’Oreal S.V. v. Bellure N.V., Case C-487/07, ¶¶ 41, 47 (ECJ 2009) 
(knockoff perfumes that were not confusingly similar violated EU dilution law).  Thus, the margin 
of appreciation granted if a country allows such uses may not be as large. 
 156.  Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01, ¶¶ 50-52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006) (case 
would apply to all applicants for loans prior to legislation) (opinion available in French only); 
Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber).  Cf. Hutten-
Csapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber) (rent control 
as violation notwithstanding widespread effect). 
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value of protecting those interests to the ECHR.157 
Finally, although the crux of the dispute is one between private 
parties, as discussed earlier, constructing an argument in favor of an 
affirmative right against a private party is not difficult.  A state tort or 
property regime that permits others to destroy one’s possessions158 could 
constitute a deprivation of the right to the enjoyment of one’s 
possessions.  Presumably, Convention member states have an 
affirmative obligation to protect possessions from interferences that are 
not in the general interest, even if that means providing private civil 
causes of action to do so.159 
In practical terms, requiring member states to protect trademarks 
against dilution would not be a seismic event.  As a result of the 
European Union’s Trademark Harmonization Directive, almost all of its 
twenty-seven members protect trademarks against dilution.160  Other 
non-EU European countries protect trademarks against dilution as 
well.161  However, once such a right is recognized as a “possession” 
under the Convention, it leads to further issues.  For example, suppose 
that the European Commission decided to narrow the scope of its non-
confusion based trademark protections so that only marks deemed 
“famous among the general consuming public of the European Union” 
were protected.162  Such an amendment would deny protection to marks 
 
 157.  To some degree, consumers may have an interest in allowing certain forms of dilution—it 
may promote competition, or it may add some terms to the lexicon.  Ty v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 
513-14 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 158.  An extreme example would be a legal regime that turned a blind eye to physical 
appropriations of one group’s tangible possessions by a competing group.  Cf. infra section VIII.C., 
discussing trade secret law. 
 159.  See Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010).  It may be 
noted that, in the absence of a protective regime, such interferences would be pursuant to law, or the 
lack thereof, but they could violate the concept of proportionality that is part of the ECHR’s 
property rights jurisprudence.  
 160.  Many of these laws were enacted pursuant to the European Union’s Trademark 
Harmonization Directive.  See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 650-58 (2d. ed. 2012).  The EU’s Community Trade Mark Regulation 
also provides for such protection.  Id. at 658-59. 
 161.  WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION, supra note 160, at 662. 
 162.  At present, the Trademark Harmonization Directive protects marks “with a reputation” 
from certain non-confusing uses. TRADEMARK HARMONIZATION DIRECTIVE, art. 4(4)(a) and 5(2); 
COMMUNITY TRADE MARK REG. art. 8(5) and 9(1)(c).  The European Court of Justice has not 
equated this limitation with a requirement of “fame,” let alone fame measured by the general 
consuming public of the EU.  My hypothetical is based on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 
2006 (“TDRA”).  Prior to this amendment, U.S. law protected “famous” trademarks from dilution.  
However, “famous” was defined in a way that arguably allowed marks famous only in a specific 
product market (what the ECJ might call the “relevant public”) to be eligible for protection.  The 
TDRA restricted dilution protection to marks whose fame extended to the “general consuming 
public of the United States.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (West 2013).  
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previously eligible.  If a trademark registration163 is a “possession” and a 
country removes an important protection from that possession, would 
that constitute an interference, subject to Article 1?  Much would depend 
on the margin of appreciation given to countries to regulate possessions 
in the public interest.  However, in other contexts, the ECHR has found 
the retroactive removal of choices in action to be violations of Article 
1.164 
B. A Property-Based Right of Publicity? 
The Von Hannover case demonstrated that celebrities could expect 
protection by Convention member countries for their personal interests 
(at least those interests covered by the Convention), by the allowance of 
a private civil action against other private actors who would invade the 
celebrity’s realm.  Von Hannover was what a United States observer 
would categorize as a right to privacy suit.  United States law, 
particularly state law, often provides additional protection to celebrities 
through the category known as right of publicity.165  Rather than 
protecting celebrities from invasions of their private space, the right of 
publicity allows celebrities to control many commercial uses of their 
names, likenesses, or “personas.”  Not all of these uses are invasive or 
undignified.  Based on the Von Hannover and Anheuser-Busch 
decisions, might the ECHR extend the right to privacy from Von 
Hannover (under Article 8) to cover the type of commercial uses 
associated with the American right of publicity (under Article 1)? 
The ECHR could hold that the rights to privacy and control of 
merchandising provided in various European countries rise to the level 
of a “possession,” and are protected by Article 1.  Clearly, the ability to 
use a celebrity’s name or likeness in the promotion of products is a 
valuable commodity.  The celebrity can license uses of his or her image 
to others, analogous to the licensing of the use of a trademark.166  In 
 
 163.  The Directive only applies to registered marks. 
 164.  E.g. Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006); Maurice v. 
France, App. No. 11810/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005) (Grand Chamber). 
 165.  In this regard, it is interesting that the California statute protecting rights of publicity 
post-mortem describes the right as a property right.  CAL. CIV. CODE §3344.1(b) (West 2013).  The 
statute protecting rights of publicity for living persons does not contain this provision. Id. at § 3344.  
See also FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 - 32-36-1-20 
(West 2013). 
 166.  See Zagouras, Commercial Exploitation, supra note 86, at 82-85.  Here it is worth noting 
that in both Von Hannover cases, Princess Caroline’s suit in the German courts included a claim 
under a provision of German law which is part of the Act on Artistic Creations—a relative of 
copyright.  Copyrights, like trademarks, would be considered possessions under Article 1.   
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Anheuser-Busch, the court stressed the pecuniary value of a trademark 
application when finding it to be a possession.  Merchandising is 
generally viewed as a valuable aspect of one’s personality.  As long as 
licensing of an image is permitted, one has a “legitimate expectation,” to 
use the ECHR’s terms, in being able to reap that value.  That being the 
case, the state’s unwillingness to allow a celebrity to police the right 
(which could either dilute its licensing value or destroy it altogether) 
could constitute an “interference” with the celebrity’s enjoyment of that 
possession.  Moreover, the ECHR is somewhat unlikely to view 
allowing such an interference as within the general interest under Article 
1, nor is it likely to view the deprivation of control of the celebrity’s 
image as proportional to the protected interest.  In Von Hannover (no. 1), 
the court gave little deference to the German courts’ assertion that 
Princess Caroline, as a public figure, was newsworthy and therefore 
invasions of her privacy were allowed.167  In the case of endorsements 
and merchandising, the purely commercial aspects of the activity 
probably would be deemed even less worthy of protection by the 
ECHR.168 
If such a right of publicity is recognized, it is likely to be more 
extensive than the analogous right recognized domestically.  U.S. courts 
are somewhat solicitous of free speech arguments when something other 
than simple “merchandising” is at issue.169  However, in Von Hannover, 
the ECHR obviously believed that there was little free speech interest in 
satisfying the public’s desire for information about a celebrity.  
Consequently, the ECHR may find little free speech interest in profiting 
from the use of another’s image, even where the use, for example, 
constitutes an artistic interpretation of the celebrity’s image.170  
 
 167.  Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, ¶ 72 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004). 
 168.  Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08, ¶¶39-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013); Hertel v. 
Switzerland, Case No. 59/1997/843/1049, ¶47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 25, 1998). 
 169.  E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, at 924-25, 931-36 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(lithograph of Tiger Woods at the Masters tournament protected by First Amendment); Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (magazine story with altered 
picture of Dustin Hoffman as “Tootsie” subject to First Amendment protection); Winter v. DC 
Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 480 (Cal. 2003) (comic book portraying Johnny and Edgar Winter as 
grotesque characters protected by First Amendment).  But cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup,  
21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) (non-transformative lithograph of Three Stooges not protected by First 
Amendment); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 100 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (comic book character named 
after former hockey player violated player’s right of publicity and not protected by First 
Amendment). 
 170.  Cf. ETW Corp. 332 F.3d 915 (lithograph of Tiger Woods at the Masters protected by First 
Amendment).  This would be consistent with the more expansive notion of moral rights in copyright 
recognized by European countries. 
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Furthermore, the broad notion of “newsworthiness” applied in some U.S. 
cases171 probably would not be an effective defense in the ECHR.172 
C. Article 1 and Trade Secret Law 
Cementing dilution protection would not fundamentally change 
existing IP rights.  But the Convention may be used to create rights as 
well as extend them.  One possibly fertile ground for creating IP rights 
from Article 1 is trade secrets.  To fully appreciate how Article 1 might 
protect trade secrets, consider whether a country with no trade secret 
protection would be obliged to protect them.  Without any domestic 
trade secret protection, one might argue that the trade secret owner has 
no “possessions” to be protected by Article 1.  However, the Anheuser-
Busch opinion contains several statements that suggest that Article 1 
would still apply.  Although the ECHR did refer to the existence of 
rights under Portuguese law relating to intellectual property (in this case, 
specifically to trademark registration applications), it also stated that a 
“possession” under Article 1 is to be considered independent of domestic 
law.173  That suggests that an Article 1 possession may not depend on 
the preexistence of actual property rights under domestic law.  
Moreover, the ECHR’s discussion of whether Anheuser-Busch’s 
application was a possession emphasized that the application had 
significant financial value—it could be sold or licensed, for example.174  
The same is true of a trade secret; it can be licensed or sold to another 
business and may have considerable financial value.175  This value 
would not depend on the willingness of any country to protect the trade 
secret from theft—its value stems from its secrecy, and, presumably, the 
expected ease of keeping it a secret.  Thus, one would expect that a trade 
secret would meet the criteria of a “possession.” 
 
 171.  See, e.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000) 
(photograph not completely unrelated to article although not of the person named in column); CBC 
Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 
2007) (fantasy baseball league can use public statistics and names of players). 
 172.  See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 (H.L.) (granting relief under the 
U.K. Human Rights Act to model for pictures taken of her outside a drug rehabilitation facility, and 
citing ECHR precedent).  The ECHR, noting the balancing and citation of ECHR precedent by the 
U.K courts, rejected an application by MGN claiming that the judgment was a violation of Article 
10.  MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04, ¶¶ 149-156 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 18, 2011). 
 173.  Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) 
(Grand Chamber). 
 174.  Id. at ¶ 76.  
 175.  Indeed, under US law, the definition of a trade secret is something that has value because 
of its secrecy.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4) (1985). 
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The next step would be to determine whether the theft of a trade 
secret is a “deprivation” or a “control” of property.  In one important 
sense, loss of a trade secret is a deprivation in that the loss of secrecy 
deprives the owner of the key component of value.  On the other hand, 
the owner retains the know-how behind the trade secret and is still able 
to use the process (or whatever the secret is).  Moreover, the 
misappropriator has an incentive not to reveal the secret any further in 
order to maintain its value.176 
For a state to justify its own interference with a possession, it would 
have to show that the interference was in accordance with domestic law.  
Presumably, in the case of a private interference, the state would have to 
at a minimum show that the private person’s actions were in some sense 
lawful.  In the trade secret context, that should mean that if the secret 
was taken by means that are independently unlawful—for example, by 
burglarizing the company’s premises—then a failure of the state to allow 
the owner to enjoin the use of the secret and/or recover for its use should 
be a violation of Article 1.177  However, the acquisition may have been 
by means that are not independently unlawful, say, by flying an airplane 
over a plant while it is being built.178  Finally, under Article 1, one must 
consider the issue of proportionality.  Presumably, a state would argue 
that weak or nonexistent trade secret protection serves the public interest 
by allowing competition and thereby lowering the price of goods or 
services.  It could also argue that weak protection serves to deter 
inappropriate uses of a trade secret (e.g., charging exorbitant prices) in 
light of the potentially perpetual nature of a trade secret, unlike a patent 
or copyright.  On the other hand, the ECHR has appeared wary of 
otherwise legitimate state policies that force an individual (as opposed to 
society at large) to bear the brunt of the policy’s downside.  Here, the 
holder of the trade secret is being made to bear the weight of the state’s 
 
 176.  This assumes that the secret was taken to exploit its economic value and not simply to 
harm the owner by revealing it in the manner of Wikileaks.  Moreover, if the secret is a customer 
list, then its loss would likely destroy its value. 
 177.  Note that even if the state allows some sort of tort action for the act of taking, if it does 
not protect the owner from the consequences of the taking, i.e., the loss of secrecy and the ability of 
another to compete, then the principle of fair balance may still be violated. 
 178.  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(taking pictures of unfinished plant by flying over it as trade secret violation).  Article 39 of TRIPS 
requires members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to protect trade secrets, so the 
likelihood of a country not having any trade secret protection is small.  But Article 39 appears not to 
require protection from all trade secret misappropriation; only appropriations by means that in the 
United States would be independently wrongful; breach of contract, inducement to breach a 
contract, and breach of confidence are clearly within the required protection of Article 39.  TRIPS 
Art. 39 fn. 10. 
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pro-competitive policies.  This compares to other situations in which the 
ECHR found a disproportionate burden and, thus, a violation of Article 
1.179  Clearly, the requirement of a trade secret regime would also 
depend on imposing affirmative obligations under Article 1, a topic 
discussed earlier. 
Trade secret protection is bolstered by Article 8, the right to 
privacy.  The essence of a trade secret is its secrecy.  One who reveals 
the secret either in violation of an understanding that it would be kept 
secret (somewhat like the British common-law claim for breach of 
confidence) or who misappropriates it, would be said to be violating 
privacy. 
D. A Mandate for Copyright? 
All European countries have some form of copyright protection.  
But what if we imagine a Europe without copyright protection?  Would 
the Convention require its existence?  Begin with Article 1.  Is there any 
“possession” that an infringer could interfere with?180  Assume you have 
created a “work” such as a manuscript for a book.  Arguably, the work is 
a possession by virtue of its potential value—one could, for instance, sell 
it to a book publisher.  Although the work itself (as opposed to a copy) is 
an intangible, the ECHR seems comfortable affording intangibles 
protection as possessions.  But would the act of unauthorized copying 
constitute an unwarranted interference?  That may depend on when the 
copying takes place.  If the manuscript is taken and published before the 
author has an opportunity to publish it, then that constitutes the strongest 
situation for interference.  A prepublication appropriation deprives the 
author of any opportunity either to extract value by sale or license or to 
control the context of the use. 
However, that opportunity can be respected by a limited tort regime 
that outlaws such prepublication appropriations, subject to limitations 
based on free speech principles,181 and possibly limits based on time—
the author’s life, for instance.  To bolster the argument under Article 1, 
 
 179.  See Pressos v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 1995); Hutten-
Czapeka v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶ 225 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber); 
Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 93 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber). 
 180.  Keep in mind that a possession cannot be based on the hope that the courts will create a 
right.  See Malhous v. Czech Republic, App. No. 3307/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2000) (Grand 
Chamber); Kopecky v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, ¶ 35(c) (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2004) (Grand 
Chamber). 
 181.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 569 (1985) 
(rejecting First Amendment defense to copyright infringement where prepublication dissemination 
took the “core” of the work). 
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we may invoke Article 8 of the Convention, the privacy provision, and 
assert that disseminating an unpublished work violates the author’s right 
to keep it private.  But none of this requires us to create a full-blown 
copyright in the work. 
A variety of roadblocks exist to the mandating of a copyright 
regime.  Even assuming that the expression of an idea (i.e., a “work”) is 
a possession of its creator, when imposing affirmative obligations under 
the Convention, the ECHR normally weighs the impact on the individual 
against the impact on the state and society, and looks to whether the 
individual is being forced to bear a disproportionate burden.182  
Although the lack of a copyright regime would reduce the value of the 
author’s work, it need not be extinguished altogether.  It may be that the 
lead-time monopoly would be sufficient to extract value from the 
work.183  It would not be as much value as a copyright monopoly, but 
there is no inherent right to make monopoly profits under Article 1, 
unless the state’s legal regime grants such rights.  Moreover, one might 
add that Article 10 of the Convention, protecting free expression, gives 
additional support for the dissemination of information without 
copyright.  Finally, the ECHR may give the state a considerable margin 
of appreciation because the imposition of a copyright regime would 
require the state to enact a potentially complex legislative scheme to 
properly balance the rights of authors and society, and this is a task ill-
suited for a court. 
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the ECHR has 
shown a fair degree of indulgence of property rights when asked to 
weigh them against free expression, at least where there were alternative 
means of expression available.184  An infringer can express him or 
herself without appropriating the author’s work.  Combined with the 
argument that free expression is actually enhanced by copyright,185 and 
the fact that the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights contains explicit 
support for intellectual property,186 the ECHR might be persuaded to 
 
 182.  See, e.g., Appleby v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44306/98, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6, 
2003); Pressos v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 1995); Hutten-Czapeka 
v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶ 225 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber); Maurice v. 
France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 93 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber).   
 183.  See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 293 (1970).  Justice (then Professor) 
Breyer wrote at a time when ebooks and widespread Internet access were not issues.  The ease with 
which books, and other materials, can be copied, distributed, and read on an e-reader such as a 
Kindle or an iPad may make his analysis outdated. 
 184.  See Appleby, App. No. 44306/98 at ¶ 48. 
 185.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012). 
 186.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2. 
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require at least a limited copyright regime protecting the author’s 
reproduction right.  However, it would be surprising if the court went 
beyond that, at least in countries without any pre-existing copyright 
regime, to impose the kind of copyright scheme contemplated by TRIPS 
or European copyright statutes.  Clearly, performance rights, display 
rights, and adaptation rights would be a rather large leap for the court, 
even if imposing a mandate of protection against reproduction would 
not.187 
This, of course, assumes no pre-existing copyright regime.  Because 
all countries joining the WTO must adhere to TRIPS, which requires at 
least some level of copyright protection, European countries would have 
some sort of copyright protection.188  Below we shall discuss possible 
extensions to an existing copyright regime that could be mandated under 
the ECHR’s Article 1, Article 8, and Article 10 jurisprudence. 
E. Moral Rights 
The Berne Convention on copyrights requires protection of what 
are conventionally called “moral rights” of authors.189  Protection of 
moral rights permits authors—even those who no longer own the 
economic rights to their works—to prevent certain uses of those 
works.190  European countries already protect the moral rights of 
authors.191  However, the scope of these rights is not uniform.  If the 
 
 187.  One would expect that the wide margin of appreciation afforded countries in a 
commercial context would allow countries to choose the details of the economic rights afforded 
authors and copyright owners. 
 188.  Russia, which already has a copyright regime, was the last major country outside of 
TRIPS.  The Russian Federation joined the World Trade Organization—thus subjecting itself to 
TRIPS—in 2012.  Seven other members of the Council of Europe—Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Monaco, San Marino, and Serbia—still are not members of the WTO.  See 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  Of 
those, all except San Marino are members of the Berne Convention.  See www.wipo.int/treaties (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2012).  San Marino is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) and the Paris Convention, and it has a copyright statute (one that also includes moral 
rights).  See www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=SM (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
 189.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis. [hereinafter 
Berne Convention].  United States copyright laws protect moral rights, but only to a limited degree.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (West 2013). 
 190.  The principal moral rights are the right of attribution, right of integrity, right of first 
publication, and right of withdrawal.  See, e.g., Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing 
the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 569, 660 & n.4; Cyrill R. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral 
Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 359 (2006).  See generally ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE 
SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (Stanford Law 
Books 2010). 
 191.  Virtually all Convention countries are members of the Berne Convention.  That does not 
guarantee implementation of a moral rights provision; Berne has no formal enforcement mechanism 
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ECHR interprets the Convention to apply to moral rights, it might 
impose some measure of uniformity.  The three provisions of the 
Convention we have been discussing could apply to moral rights. 
Conceivably, Article 10 of the Convention could be used to limit 
moral rights.  However, this seems unlikely, especially if the moral 
rights of authors are analogized to a kind of dignity interest similar to the 
interest protected by Article 8.192 
On the other side of the coin, Article 1, First Protocol, could 
provide the means to expand moral rights.  There are, however, several 
potential obstacles to using Article 1 as a source of moral rights.  First, 
Article 1 requires the existence of a “possession.”  Given the fairly broad 
view of possessions taken by the ECHR in Anheuser-Busch, one might 
not expect this to be a serious obstacle.  But, in fact, this may be a 
serious issue.  An author’s moral rights are independent of her 
ownership of the copyright in the work.  Thus, the economic rights to the 
copyright may be owned by someone other than the author.  Moral rights 
give the author the right to require attribution, to prevent alteration of the 
work, and to prevent uses that would bring dishonor to the author.193  
These are not inherently pecuniary rights.  They appear not to be 
intended to give the author extra money for the work by imposing an 
obligation to pay for its use.  Rather, they appear to exist to allow the 
author to prevent certain uses of the copyrighted work.  Thus, they 
would not have a monetary value.  Conceivably, if the moral rights are 
waivable, the copyright owner (or a licensee) might pay an extra sum to 
the author for a waiver.  The availability of that extra value might be 
sufficient to make moral rights into a “possession.”  But not all countries 
permit waivers, and those that do differ on the exact parameters of the 
 
and neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the European Union require moral rights implementation.  
Rigamonti, Deconstructing, supra note 190, at 357-58.  See Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra 
note 190, at 706-09 (discussing moral rights implementation in various countries); TRIPS 
Agreement, art. 9(1) (specifically excluding Berne’s moral rights provision from TRIPS).  However, 
at least formally, European copyright statutes appear to include some form of moral rights, as 
indicated by the statutes listed in the WIPO database WIPOLEX. 
 192.  This does not mean that Article 8 would be a direct source of moral rights.  Though not 
inconceivable, it is unlikely that an alteration of an author’s work would rise to the level of an 
invasion of the author’s privacy.  But cf. Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra note 190, at 707 
(noting that the United Kingdom used privacy-like protection to implement moral rights).  
Nevertheless, when considering the proper scope of free expression, one would expect the ECHR to 
consider the countervailing dignity interest of the author. 
 193.  See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 189, at art. 6bis (giving authors, inter alia, the 
right to prevent actions “in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to [the author’s] 
honor or reputation.”). 
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rights and the ability to waive.194  This is a difficult question, not easily 
answered by the ECHR’s case law. 
However, if the ECHR finds that moral rights are possessions, an 
unauthorized alteration of the work could be considered an interference 
with that right, and therefore a violation of the right to enjoy one’s 
possessions.  There are several areas in which a failure to enforce or 
allow moral rights could lead to an Article 1 claim.  The Berne 
Convention gives rights against uses that harm an author’s reputation, 
but an author might want to challenge other alterations of (or perhaps the 
imminent destruction of) the work.  Presumably, the government would 
defend on the basis of the general interest in making various uses—
especially “transformative” or communicative uses—of an existing work 
without interference by the author.  This defense would be strengthened 
if the copyright owner gave consent to, and was paid for, the use.  In that 
case, the moral rights of the author interfere with the economic rights of 
the copyright owner.  This invokes Article 1 in favor of the copyright 
owner and Article 10 in favor of communication to the public.  Given 
the normal margin of appreciation, that should make the government’s 
inaction consistent with the general interest.  The remaining question 
would be one of proportionality.  If the author’s interest is purely 
pecuniary, it is unlikely to trump the general interest.  Whether an author 
who simply feels personally insulted by the use despite its lack of effect 
on reputation or honor would claim an undue imposition (in the manner 
perhaps of Article 8) is a more difficult question to answer.  If the ECHR 
views the use as having little communicative value, then the author’s 
prospect of winning is significant.195  On the other hand, if imposing a 
right to preclude alterations, which may interfere with the normal right 
to allow derivative works, significantly interferes with the economic 
value of the work, then the author’s imposition may be deemed 
disproportionate.196 
The ECHR could also include Article 8 in the analysis of moral 
 
 194.  See WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS 26-52 (Mar. 1, 1996) (discussing waiver policies of fourteen countries and the 
European Union).  Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2013) (allowing waiver of rights under the Visual 
Artists Rights Act).   
 195.  The imminent destruction of a work raises different questions.  If it is a publicly 
displayed work, then the public loses out by its destruction.  But there is a countervailing interest in 
the owner of the embodiment of the work (a sculpture, painting, etc.), which might be protected 
under Article 1, especially if destruction is economically necessary.  But if the author is willing to 
pay compensation, the balance tips in another direction. 
 196.  This also raises the question whether a broad moral right to preclude any alteration overly 
interferes with the copyright owner’s interest, which is protected under Article 1. 
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rights.197  To the extent that moral rights represent the author’s 
personality imbued in the work, a right of personality would be a 
possible way to protect that interest.198  There would be a need to 
balance any Article 8 right against an Article 10 right of free 
expression—especially if an alteration of a work promotes a debate on a 
matter of general interest.199  The proportionality inquiry would be more 
complicated.  The author of a work that has been made public may have 
to accept a certain level of public use of the work.200  However, 
alterations that impugn the reputation of the author may be deemed 
excessive in light of the point being made.  If the author’s claim is that 
any alteration is impermissible, then, as noted above, Article 10 and 
Article 1 may enter the picture—Article 10 favors dissemination of 
differing points of view and Article 1 protects the economic value of the 
work, which in this case is owned by the copyright owner, not 
necessarily the author. 
Because moral rights are part of an international treaty, inferring 
such rights from the Convention, like trademark dilution, may not 
represent a significant inroad in the world of intellectual property.  
However, given the variation in moral rights among different countries, 
even those that adhere to the Berne Convention, it is possible that the 
ECHR would decide to protect those rights to an extent not provided by 
all countries (as in Von Hannover).  Moreover, the ECHR could review 
the legitimacy of certain limitations on moral rights.  This independent 
analysis could cause problems in connection with a waiver of moral 
rights, an area where countries do have different rules.  On the one hand, 
the ECHR may find that upholding a waiver given under somewhat 
coercive circumstances is a violation of the right.  On the other hand, the 
ECHR could rule that a failure to allow an author to recoup the 
pecuniary value of waiving the right is also a violation.  Finally, the 
application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation could allow some 
variation in the precise scope of the rights. 
 
 197.  See Rigamonti, Deconstructing, supra note 190, at 393-94 (discussing use of rights of 
personality in some countries to protect moral rights). 
 198.  Burghartz v. Switzerland, App. No. 16213/90, ¶ 24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1994) (noting 
the importance of one’s name to personal autonomy). 
 199.  Article 10 would seem to favor a right of attribution insofar as it disseminates accurate 
information about the work to the public. 
 200.  Cf. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶120 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 
2012) (Grand Chamber) (noting that public status is not irrelevant to analysis under Article 8). 
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F. Rights to Traditional Knowledge 
One other area in which the Convention could be used to expand 
intellectual property rights is traditional knowledge.201  As chronicled by 
other scholars, various forms of traditional knowledge and folklore, 
including songs, dances, and knowledge of the medicinal properties of 
various plants, have value in the modern world.202  This knowledge often 
is not considered to be the individual property of any one person, but, 
rather, is “owned” by the group for the benefit of the group.  In some 
instances, outsiders have sought to exploit this knowledge and tradition 
and to acquire IP rights in that knowledge and tradition.  Article 1, First 
Protocol provides a possible means of preventing such acquisitions by 
granting rights to the group (or, if identifiable, the individuals) from 
which the knowledge and tradition originates.  Such knowledge and 
tradition, having value, should be considered a possession.  However, 
the issue of who owns the possession is particularly significant.  Unlike 
Articles 8 and 10, Article 1 specifically gives rights to “[e]very natural 
or legal person.”203  But depending on the structure of the group 
claiming rights in the traditional knowledge, it may not be deemed a 
“legal person.”  And the individuals within the group may not have a 
sufficient right of ownership to be able to bring suit individually under 
Article 1.204 
Article 34 of the Convention may be of some assistance in dealing 
with this problem.  Article 34 allows individual suits in the ECHR 
against member countries.  But Article 34 does not limit standing to 
“individuals,” or “legal persons,” be they natural persons or 
 
 201.  A number of articles have discussed the possibility of using various human rights 
conventions to protect traditional knowledge.  For a recent example, see Rebecca Gross, The “I” in 
Indigenous: Enforcing Individual Rights Guarantees in an Indigenous Group Rights Context, 27 
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65 (2010). 
 202.  See, e.g., Gary K. Schlais, The Patenting of Sacred Biological Resources, the Taro Patent 
Controversy in Hawai’i: A Soft Law Proposal, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 581 (2007); Christine Haight 
Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. 
L. REV. 1 (1997).  The rather simple argument I am presenting here deliberately sidesteps many 
complications and nuances of the debate about protecting traditional knowledge.  It is not my 
purpose in this paper to take sides in this debate.  The arguments here are based only on what could 
occur, and are not normative judgments about such results. 
 203.  Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, article 1. 
 204.  See, e.g., Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, ¶ 64-65, 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 
1995) (shareholders not considered proper applicants on behalf of corporation—one dissenter 
thought shareholders should be proper applicants); Holy Synod Of The Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria, App. No. 412/03, ¶ 168 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 22, 2009) (ousted 
former members of church leadership, who did not claim ownership interests in the property of the 
church, not proper applicants for Article 1 action). 
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corporations.  Instead, it permits suit by any “non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a 
violation” of the Convention.205  Thus, in order to invoke the protection 
of the Convention, a group need not have any particular structure.  While 
this does not necessarily override the limits of Article 1, it does suggest a 
possible solution.  Article 13 of the Convention requires countries to 
provide “an effective remedy” for violations of Convention rights.206  If 
a country refuses to grant legal status to a group, effectively making it 
impossible for anyone to challenge the country’s decision to allow others 
to use, or even acquire rights in, the traditional knowledge, it may be 
failing to provide an effective remedy for a Convention violation.  Of 
course, such a remedy could take many forms, but if the barriers to a 
challenge are severe, Article 13 could provide the means to allow the 
group some sort of effective enforcement.  That would require either the 
country or the group to come up with some appropriate representative or 
representatives to bring the action.207  This analysis would permit a 
group claiming rights to traditional knowledge to have standing in the 
ECHR to sue for interference with their possessory interests in the 
traditional knowledge.208  The ECHR may also look to the recent WIPO 
 
 205.  Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34. 
 206.  Id. at art. 13.  Article 1 of the Convention—the actual one, not the one in the First 
Protocol—commits member states to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.”  Id. at art. 1.  Although Article 1, First Protocol, 
is not in Section 1, Article 5, First Protocol effectively merges the provisions of the First Protocol 
with the existing Convention. 
 207.  Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (West 2013) (the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which references other 
statutes defining “Indian” and “Indian tribe”). 
 208.  But whether such a group could claim to be a “victim” under Article 34 could raise 
problems analogous to the natural or legal person problem of Article 1.  On the other hand, case law 
under Article 13 only requires that there be an “arguable” violation of the Convention in order to 
trigger the effective remedy requirement.  See G.R. v. Netherlands, App. No. 22251/07, ¶ 44 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2012).  Although that seems grounded in the substance of the Convention—i.e., 
one must have an arguable claim that the substance of a Convention right to which you would be 
entitled has been violated—it would seem reasonable to include procedure within the ambit of 
Article 13 as well.  The ECHR has said that the concept of a “possession” in Article 1 has an 
“autonomous” meaning that is not dependent on the law of a particular country.  It is logical to 
extend that reasoning to the meaning of “legal person” as well.  Exactly who “owns,” or at least has 
the right to represent the interest of groups claiming interests in traditional knowledge is the subject 
of some debate.  I will assume that there is some principled way to identify the “group” and some 
equally principled way to identify a proper representative for the group.  I am also assuming that, 
even if the group does not recognize “ownership” in the same manner contemplated by Article 1, 
the ECHR would recognize that having a legitimate interest in excluding others from using the 
knowledge is the equivalent of “possessing” it, making the knowledge a possession within the 
meaning of Article 1.  In addition to Article 13, Article 14, which prohibits discrimination, might be 
applicable if the country effectively favors outsiders over indigenous groups that have traditional 
knowledge.  Convention, supra note 9, at art. 14. 
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draft of a protective scheme for traditional knowledge209 as evidence of 
an emerging consensus that such knowledge should be protected in some 
manner and that the Convention should not erect artificial barriers to the 
realization of such protection. 
A state that gave IP rights in this knowledge to the outsiders could 
be required to recognize the rights of the indigenous owners under 
Article 1, or at least give compensation for the interference.  This, of 
course, assumes that the exploitation of such knowledge by others 
constitutes an interference, or that the state could not allow such 
exploitation as being in the general interest (as permitted by Article 
1).210 
Interestingly, the Article 1 approach could allow the problem of 
traditional knowledge to be analyzed outside of the strict confines of 
traditional intellectual property law.211  This could permit a more 
flexible approach to the problem.  Moreover, certain limits of traditional 
IP rights, such as durational limits, ownership issues (subject to the 
“natural or legal person” issue discussed above), and fixation issues 
(whether the knowledge is “fixed” in some tangible way), are not 
necessarily obstacles under Article 1.  In particular, the ECHR’s 
proportionality requirement under Article 1 could permit a certain 
degree of flexibility in balancing the competing claims of various groups 
to this knowledge under certain circumstances.  For example, the state’s 
interest with respect to the use of certain biologically significant plants 
that confer a public benefit by being made available might outweigh the 
interest of an individual or even a group in keeping the knowledge 
within the group.  However, the public interest in making dances, songs, 
or artwork available—and assigning ownership to other than the 
originating group—may be deemed disproportionately small compared 
to the group or individual interest at stake.  And, if one factors in 
possible Article 8 rights to privacy that could be asserted by the group to 
 
 209.  Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/index.html (last visited May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Traditional 
Knowledge].  Article 2 of this document lists the intended beneficiaries of protection.  Article 3, 
among other things, requires countries to provide “adequate and effective legal measures” to protect 
the interests of the beneficiaries. 
 210.  For example, if the traditional knowledge had medicinal value and the group refused to 
license it, this might trigger the general interest provision.  See Shuba Ghosh, Reflections on the 
Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L AND COMP. L. 497, 509-510 (2003) 
(comparing this problem to the problem of moral rights). However, it is also possible that, under the 
proportionality concept, the ECHR would require the state to give some compensation to the group. 
 211.  Farley, Protecting Folklore, supra note 202, at 40-50 (discussing alternatives to 
traditional copyright protection). 
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its knowledge,212 the balancing would not necessarily favor the usual IP 
rights regime.213 
IX.  SOME CAUTIONARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF THE 
CONVENTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 
A. Who Are the Primary Beneficiaries of Expanded Rights Under the 
Convention?  Follow the Money 
To the extent that Article 1 is used to expand IP rights, those cases 
will revolve around assets with a pecuniary value.  Although applicants 
in the ECHR generally request monetary damages, the value of creating 
or extending IP rights often extends beyond the particular incident 
giving rise to the claim.  The value of IP rights makes it likely that IP 
owners will go to great lengths to assert their rights.  Though not the 
exclusive province of corporations, corporate ownership of IP rights 
appears to predominate over individual ownership.  Thus, IP rights may 
favor corporate rights holders over other individuals.214  Though this is 
not inherently bad, a corporate actor may have more resources to take 
cases to the ECHR than an individual, and the availability of legal 
advice to promote such action.  The ECHR increasingly may find itself 
asked to decide commercial issues in the form of human rights cases, 
potentially crowding its calendar at the expense of other cases.  The 
ECHR is already behind in its adjudication of claims.215  Adding IP 
rights claims in large numbers would increase the delay for all claims. 
Of course, some of the expansion discussed above might not 
 
 212.  The WIPO draft on traditional knowledge protection acknowledges the privacy aspect of 
traditional knowledge.  Traditional Knowledge, supra note 209, art. 1, § 1.2 (Option 1). 
 213.  Compare Von Hannover v. Germany (no.1), App. No. 59320/00, ¶ 74-80 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
June 24, 2004) (finding Germany’s balance of free expression and privacy to be inconsistent with 
Article 8) with Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶¶ 124-126 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Feb. 7, 2012) (finding Germany’s balance consistent with Article 8). 
 214.  Of course, corporations own other forms of property as well.  But in cases involving that 
type of property—real property being a prime example—protecting corporate rights can be a useful 
proxy for protecting individual owners since a large number of individuals own the same type of 
property. 
 215.  According to the Court’s statistics, it disposed of nearly twice as many applications in the 
first month of 2012 compared with the same period in 2011.  All of that increase is from decisions 
ruling applications inadmissible or striking them out; the number of full judgments issued by the 
Court actually declined from year to year.  This indicates an effort to ease the Court’s backlog.  On 
the other hand, there are still over 152,000 pending cases.  Although the number of dispositions 
increased year to year, the Court’s backlog increased by about 1,000 cases per month.  See Analysis 
of Statistics 2011, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (Apr. 25, 2013) and Statistics 1/1-
31/8/2012, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 25, 2013).  Both available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/Statistical+data/. 
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redound to the benefit of traditional IP rights holders.  A mandate to 
protect traditional knowledge could benefit groups that presently do not 
own IP rights.  Similarly, an expansion of moral rights would favor 
authors over copyright owners, but this would still leave the problem of 
clogging an already backlogged court. 
B.  Expanding Rights by Affirmative Obligation 
The Von Hannover case signals a potential expansion of rights in 
another way, by imposing obligations beyond the negative requirement 
that a government may not interfere with fundamental freedoms.  No one 
connected with the German government intruded upon Princess 
Caroline’s privacy.  Her complaint was about private parties’ intrusions; 
it was a private tort action.  Yet the ECHR ruled that the German 
government had an affirmative obligation to protect her privacy by 
preventing private parties from intruding and affording her a civil 
remedy for those intrusions.216  In the wake of Von Hannover, it has 
been argued that the British trademark office’s refusal to register 
celebrity names as trademarks for celebrity merchandise—on the 
grounds that the public does not view them as trademarks—violates the 
Convention’s equal protection guarantee found in Article 14.217  Rather 
than limiting the scope of IP rights, such arguments expand them.  This 
means that the ECHR could mandate a tort scheme if it deems it 
necessary to fulfill the requirements of the Convention.  This raises 
difficult problems of the extent to which such mandates could, perhaps 
unintentionally, upset legal regimes that go beyond the immediate right 
at issue.  Such mandates can have consequences far beyond the 
immediate confines of the case before the ECHR.218  One may question 
 
 216.  The affirmative nature of this obligation was reaffirmed by the ECHR in subsequent 
cases.  See, e.g., Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 
2011); Karhuvaara v. Finland, App. No. 53678/00, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004). 
 217.  The argument is that Britain is discriminating against celebrities based on status.   
 218.  For a U.S. perspective on this issue, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Although he wrote in dissent, and in a 
different context, Justice Brennan’s words resonate in this context as well:  
The Court requires that the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency be weighed 
against the competing interest in judicial independence.  In doing so, the Court pits an 
interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, 
the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and 
not worth the cost in any single case.  Thus, while this balancing creates the illusion of 
objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result was foreordained, because the balance is 
weighted against judicial independence. . . .  The danger of the Court’s balancing 
approach is, of course, that as individual cases accumulate in which the Court finds that 
the short-term benefits of efficiency outweigh the long-term benefits of judicial 
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whether such an effort is more appropriately subject to resolution by 
legislation, or, in multinational circumstances, by treaty. 
C. Complications for Other Multilateral Agreements 
Having a multinational tribunal governed by the Convention 
creating IP rights could create a variety of complications for other 
multinational agreements and organizations.  Consider first the European 
Union, all of whose members are adherents to the Convention.  As 
discussed above, some of the rights that could be inferred from the 
Convention already exist in the European Union.  However, it was also 
noted that basing rights in the Convention could prevent the EU from 
altering the scope of those rights (at least where the alteration narrows 
those rights) in response to changing conditions.  If the Strasbourg court 
becomes a pan-European constitutional arbiter of IP law, it may 
complicate the position of the EU’s member states.  Presently, the courts 
of member states can seek guidance from the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) as the ultimate source of guidance on EU law.  Although the 
ECJ will use the Convention in its decisions, its interpretations may not 
correspond to those of the Strasbourg Court.219  That creates a quandary 
for European courts.  They are bound by treaty to accept the ECJ’s 
interpretation of EU law.220  But they also are bound by the terms of the 
Convention to accept the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.  That would 
make it difficult for EU members to have certainty about their laws, 
even after ECJ review. 
A separate, but related problem involves the EU’s attempts to 
harmonize and unify its IP laws.  Consider, for example, the Community 
Trade Mark (“CTM”) system.  That system is a centralized system for 
the granting of rights good throughout the EU.  It is not controlled by 
individual member states; the registration system is operated by the 
Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market, or OHIM, and 
OHIM’s decisions are reviewed by the EU’s Court of First Instance and 
the ECJ, although infringement suits are brought in courts of the member 
 
independence, the protections of Article III will be eviscerated.   
 
If one substitutes “the member state’s perception of the general interest” for “judicial 
independence,” the basis for the comparison is clear. 
 219.  Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible 
Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19 
DICK. INT’L L. ANN. 301 (2001). 
 220.  See also Murray v. Express Newspapers plc, [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch) [¶ 60-62] (British 
courts are bound to follow House of Lords decisions in cases of conflict with European Court of 
Human Rights decisions). 
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states designated for that purpose.  Conceivably, the Strasbourg court 
might review member state decisions implementing the CTM system, 
even though the EU itself is not part of the Council of Europe.221 
A further problem is the effect of ECHR pronouncements on treaty 
negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral.  The as-yet largely unused 
ability to require IP rights to conform to the Convention could create 
uncertainty about the ability of Convention signatories to abide by their 
commitments.  This is ameliorated somewhat by the fact that such inter-
country agreements are likely to expand, rather than contract, IP rights.  
The ECHR’s entry into this area thus may be consistent with the 
negotiation of IP rights treaties.  Also, the margin of appreciation could 
allow leeway to countries, at least up to a point. 
But when IP rights are outside of the realm of traditional IP rights, 
such as rights to traditional knowledge, the effect of the ECHR may be 
more pronounced.  From the perspective of countries that do not favor 
expanded rights, it may lessen their leverage in negotiations with 
Convention countries.  Alternatively, Convention countries will have 
less leeway to compromise in negotiations relating to such rights, even if 
they might be inclined to do so, because of the need to give effect to 
ECHR cases (whether this is a good or bad result may depend on one’s 
perspective about the protection of traditional knowledge).  Moreover, 
the uncertainty inherent in the ECHR’s jurisprudence—margin of 
appreciation and fair balance come to mind here—makes it difficult to 
predict how future cases might come out.  This may make it more 
difficult to negotiate even taking cognizance of possible ECHR action.  
Moreover, if non-Convention countries are less interested in expanding 
certain IP rights (say, moral rights in the United States), then negotiating 
a universally accepted regime would be difficult.222 
The effect of the ECHR on regimes like TRIPS is more difficult to 
evaluate.  TRIPS acts as a minimum standard; it is not a global uniform 
IP rights regime.  An expansion of IP rights, as long as it does not 
conflict with other TRIPS concerns such as national treatment or most 
favored nation, would not harm the TRIPS regime.  In theory, the ECHR 
could make it difficult for a country to exercise some of the discretion 
granted by TRIPS.  For example, Article 31 of TRIPS permits countries 
 
 221.  Similar questions also could be raised concerning EU law relating to patents, industrial 
designs, and copyrights. 
 222.  The usual rule of territoriality would allow countries to have different levels of protection 
if they so desired.  The problem is limited to situations where countries wish to negotiate a uniform 
level of treatment, supplanting territoriality. 
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to issue compulsory patent licenses under certain circumstances.223  The 
ECHR might rule that the safeguards of TRIPS are insufficiently 
protective of patent rights under Article 1 and that compulsory licenses 
constitute an unwarranted interference with possessions—patent rights.  
Although such a ruling would not put the Convention countries in 
violation of TRIPS (TRIPS only permits, but does not compel, the 
issuance of licenses), it would undermine an important compromise built 
into the international IP rights regime.224 
D. The “Cheapening” of Human Rights? 
The intellectual property applications of the Convention, 
particularly the balancing approach of the ECHR in Von Hannover, may 
temper expansive notions of IP rights with the need to consider other 
societal concerns as boundaries.  However, there is a countervailing 
possibility.  IP rights have long been strongly influenced by “natural 
law” elements.  That is, IP rights are often seen as the natural entitlement 
resulting from one’s intellectual labors.225  Although in the United States 
a utilitarian approach to IP may be more prevalent, 226 there is evidence 
of a strong “natural entitlement” strain in our law as well.  The landmark 
case of International News Service v. Associated Press227 states this 
most forcefully as restricting a defendant that “reap[s] where it has not 
sown.”228  It is also found in the federal trademark dilution statute, which 
grants rights to owners of famous trademarks against uses that do not 
cause confusion.229  The scope of moral rights of authors in copyright 
law—where Europe has embraced strong protection far more avidly than 
 
 223.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), art. 31.  
The more general set of patent exceptions is in Article 30.  In addition, the Doha Declaration allows 
countries additional leeway when deciding to issue such licenses.  See Declaration on the TRIPS 
agreement and public health, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm (2001) (last visited Mar. 22, 2012). 
 224.  See Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6, at 36-51 (discussing different possible 
paradigms for the ECHR to follow and possible consequences). 
 225.  John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5 
(Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
 226.  By “utilitarian” I am referring to the Patent and Copyright Clause’s first sentence: that 
these rights are granted “To promote Science and the useful arts.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 227.  248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 228.  Id. at 239. 
 229.  Courts have stated that this protects only mark owners, not consumers.  TCPIP Holding 
Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).  Other courts have posited that 
dilution can aid consumers by lowering search costs.  See e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 
511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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the United States—is also evidence of a natural rights approach.230  The 
point is that IP rights holders often seek to restrain what they might 
describe as “unfair” uses of their property, not just those that threaten the 
utilitarian system supporting the rights—i.e., even when other parts of 
society may have an interest in restricting those rights, and when the 
incentive to produce new works is not seriously threatened. 
Putting this in the context of the Von Hannover and Anheuser-
Busch cases, a celebrity might argue the “unfairness” of permitting 
someone to profit from the image of, or a perceived connection to, the 
celebrity.231  The user may respond by claiming a free speech interest 
under Article 10, or the government may claim a right under Article 1, 
First Protocol, to regulate property in the general interest.  At this point, 
the Von Hannover case requires a balancing between the interests at 
issue.  The danger is that the balancing may be influenced by the 
seeming “unfairness” of the offender’s actions (which implicitly 
assumes the correctness of the complainant’s case), leading the court to 
undervalue the rights of the offender (such as rights of free expression), 
especially if they are not in a “traditional” form for those rights.232  The 
result would be a precedent that would “cheapen” the value of the right 
opposing the IP right, even outside the context of intellectual property. 
On a larger scale, the question is whether the ECHR will be 
sensitive to the differences between creating or expanding IP rights and 
affirmative obligations in other human rights contexts.  Without such 
sensitivity, precedents set in the IP rights context could have 
unpredictable and possibly unwanted effects in other human rights 
contexts.233  Certainly the almost holistic nature of the ECHR’s case law 
in this area allows for a fair degree of contextual balancing.  How the 
 
 230.  “Moral rights” give authors of copyrighted works rights of attribution and rights against 
uses that would harm their reputations even against the owners of the copyright. 
 231.  See, e.g., Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356 (Va. 1995) (sale of 
house identified as formerly owned by football player John Riggins). 
 232.  Cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), where First Amendment 
rights were considered in the context of artwork; Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (rights of publicity and First Amendment relating to use in a video game). 
 233.  Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (incorporating 
right to jury trial in criminal cases should not require incorporating “all of the ancillary rules which 
have been or may hereafter be developed incidental to the right to jury trial in the federal courts.”); 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that different 
standards should apply to the requirement of a unanimous jury in federal and state courts); Apodaca 
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous 
verdict); id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[u]ntil today, it has been universally 
understood that a unanimous verdict is an essential element of a Sixth Amendment jury trial.”).  The 
point is that a lack of sensitivity to context may lead the ECHR to lessen some traditionally 
understood rights in order to maintain consistency with cases involving IP rights. 
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Court uses that discretion may determine how human rights will evolve 
in the future. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Although IP rights are not the type of rights typically imagined as 
human rights, the case law of the ECHR allows one to imagine using the 
Convention to expand IP rights.  The Von Hannover cases give us two 
important pieces of the IP rights puzzle: the notion of an affirmative 
responsibility on the part of member countries to protect against private 
incursions on Convention-protected rights, and a limited view of free 
expression where privacy and commercial interests are at stake.  The 
Anheuser-Busch case indicates the possible use of the Convention’s 
property rights protection—Article 1 of the First Protocol—as a means 
of protecting IP rights.  Combine an affirmative obligation to protect 
Convention rights from private intrusion with a broad view of “property” 
(or “possessions”) and you have the possibility of significant protection 
for IP rights emanating from the Convention.  As yet, the ECHR’s case 
law has not put all of the pieces together to create broad IP protection.  
But, as shown by the discussion above, there is case law in addition to 
Von Hannover and Anheuser-Busch that suggests the possibility. 
The possibility that the Convention could be used to expand IP 
rights raises several concerns, not the least of which is the 
appropriateness of the ECHR as arbiter of IP rights among the forty-
seven members of the Council of Europe.  I do not claim that the 
possibility is likely or that it is normatively a good thing.  The 
possibilities raised in this article may never come to pass.  But, given the 
effect that a leap into the IP rights sphere could have on the enforcement 
of human rights, it seems sensible to contemplate the leap and consider 
whether to embrace the possibility or prepare to resist it. 
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